In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful

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


# Biographic Handbook

## *USSR, Supplement IV*

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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## PREFACE

The Biographic Handbook Program, administered by the Office of Central Reference, is designed to provide a periodic, completely updated desk reference of biographic intelligence on the key personalities in each country.

Current significance in the life of the country will be the sole criterion for including personalities in the Handbook. The coverage for each country will vary, depending on the degree of US interest in the particular country, with maximum coverage of up to 200 individuals for the USSR and China.

Manpower permitting, a Handbook will be completely updated about every 3 years. Supplementary reports may occasionally be issued on newcomers who rise to prominence, or when events in a particular country suggest the value of additional reports. At the time of the complete update, personalities will be reevaluated for inclusion on the basis of their current status; some reports will be new, some updated, and others dropped entirely. Each user may retain or destroy the superseded reports as he thinks fit; the Office of Central Reference maintains a complete historical file of them.

This supplement contains reports on 21 prominent Soviet personalities, arranged alphabetically by surname. A cumulative index to the biographic reports in the *Biographic Handbook: USSR* and its supplements appears at the back of this publication. Recipients are encouraged to submit additional or amended information on the people included in this publication and to suggest others for inclusion in future editions.

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Igor' Dmitriyevich MOROKHOV
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE

April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of CR BH 75-10

SUBJECT: Biographic Handbook: USSR, Supplement IV

The attached *Biographic Handbook: USSR*, Supplement IV, CR 77-10705, April 1977, is the fourth supplement to CR BH 75-10, *Biographic Handbook: USSR*. This supplement is issued under a new Handbook program designed to provide periodic, completely updated Handbooks on the key personalities in a given country.

Queries concerning the Handbook series may be directed to this office (ISG/PC, Code 143, ext. 7200). Overseas recipients may direct their comments through State channels to INR/OIL/B.

Bettye B. Zepht

BETTYE B. ZEPHT
Program Coordinator
Information Services Group

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## USSR — Viktor Grigor'yevich AFANAS'YEV

*Chief Editor, Pravda*

(1976)

Viktor Afanas'yev (pronounced ahfahNAHSyef) has been chief editor of *Pravda*—a newspaper that serves as the official voice of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)—since March 1976. He succeeded Mikhail Zimyanin, who moved up to become a member of the Central Committee Secretariat, the Party's top executive body. Afanas'yev had previously served since 1974 as chief editor of the CPSU theoretical journal *Kommunist*—a post he assumed after working for nearly 6 years as deputy chief editor at *Pravda* under Zimyanin's direction. In 1976 Afanas'yev became a voting member of the CPSU Central Committee and succeeded Zimyanin as board chairman of the USSR Union of Journalists.

### The Rewards of Moderation

While Afanas'yev has no direct career ties with any member of the Soviet leadership, he probably has few detractors among them: Whether from personal conviction or a recognition of the political realities, he has remained a steadfast "middle-of-the-roader" during recent years, his views apparently consistent with the official consensus. An illustration of Afanas'yev's typically balanced approach is his stand on the application of technology to economic management: While advocating the widespread use of computers as a management tool (a fairly progressive idea in the Soviet context), he has balanced that stand with a warning that technicians in charge of those computers must always remain under close Party control. Afanas'yev is the author of *Fundamentals of Philosophical Knowledge*, a Marxist textbook, and such monographs as "Scientific Administration of Society," "Problems of Integrity in Philosophy and Biology," and "Scientific Communism." He has been a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences since 1972 and a member of the editorial board of the Academy's journal *Voprosy Filosofii* (Questions of Philosophy) since at least 1969.

### Early Life and Career

Viktor Grigor'yevich Afanas'yev was born on 18 November 1922 in Aktanysh, a village in the Tatar Autonomous Republic. He served in the Soviet Army from 1940 until 1953, graduating by correspondence in 1950

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from the Chita Pedagogical Institute. After completing his military service, he became a teacher at the Chelyabinsk Pedagogical Institute, and by 1960 he had become the institute's deputy director. From 1960 until 1968 Afanas'yev headed the Chair of Scientific Communism at the CPSU Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences. In 1968 he became *Pravda's* deputy chief editor for "questions of theory," a post apparently created especially for him, and he later advanced to first deputy chief editor.

### Travel

Afanas'yev has visited Italy (1970 and 1975) and France (1971 and 1976). In May 1975 he traveled to the United States to attend a US-Soviet seminar on planning.

### Personal Data

According to Boris Strel'nikov, a *Pravda* commentator on US affairs, Afanas'yev is a dandy and the butt of many jokes; his clothes, manners, and taste in food and women are all subjects of considerable gossip. Strel'nikov hastened to add, however, that Afanas'yev is an extremely able chief editor.

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1 April 1977





## USSR Andrey Mikhaylovich ALEKSANDROV-AGENTOV



(1974)

***Aide to CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev***

One of five publicly identified aides (*pomoshchniki*) to General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, Andrey Aleksandrov-Agentov (pronounced ahlek-SAHNdruf-ahGHENTuf) is Brezhnev's chief foreign policy adviser. He also serves as the General Secretary's key speech writer and accompanies him on most of his trips abroad. Since 1971 Aleksandrov has constantly accompanied Brezhnev in his meetings with US officials, including the summit talks held in the United States in 1973. Aleksandrov-Agentov (often shortened to Aleksandrov) has worked closely with Brezhnev for nearly 15 years, in a relationship that one observer has described as an attraction of opposites—Brezhnev, the Party apparatchik of humble origin, and Aleksandrov, the urbane and cultured model of a 19th century diplomat.

In the blurred division of responsibilities among Brezhnev's aides, Aleksandrov's area of specialization appears to encompass American affairs and the larger East-West problems, probably including arms control matters. As Brezhnev's chief foreign policy adviser, however, Aleksandrov might be described more accurately as a generalist who coordinates and screens information flowing in from Soviet institutions with some responsibilities in the area of foreign policy—the Foreign Ministry, the Committee for State Security (KGB), foreign studies institutes, and certain departments of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). This kind of wide-ranging authority has inevitably produced some friction with the foreign affairs bureaucracy and, according to a former high official in the Polish Foreign Ministry, Aleksandrov has made many enemies. His position with Brezhnev, however, remains secure, as shown most recently in March 1976 by his promotion to nonvoting membership in the CPSU Central Committee.

### Early Life and Career

Andrey Mikhaylovich Aleksandrov-Agentov was born on 16 April 1918 in Altay Kray in Siberia. He studied German and Scandinavian languages at Leningrad State University and then joined the Foreign Ministry in 1942. Aleksandrov was trained in the diplomatic service in Stockholm, working under Aleksandra Kollontay, a former associate of Lenin's and the Soviet

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Union's first female diplomat. He was assigned to the Third European Department (Austria and Germany) of the Foreign Ministry from 1950 until 1958, when he began serving as an adviser and expert at various international conferences. In 1960, for example, he attended the abortive Soviet-US Summit in Paris and traveled with then Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to the 15th UN General Assembly.

**Joining Brezhnev's Team**

Like Politburo member Konstantin Chernenko, another longtime Brezhnev associate, Aleksandrov served in the Secretariat of the Supreme Soviet Presidium during Brezhnev's tenure as Presidium Chairman; Brezhnev was elected to that post in 1960, and Aleksandrov joined his staff the following year. When Brezhnev became a Party Secretary in 1963, he apparently selected Aleksandrov as his personal aide. Aleksandrov's position became public knowledge when the official record of the 23rd CPSU Congress, held in April 1966, was published; his name and title appeared in the list of Congress delegates. At the next Party Congress, in 1971, Aleksandrov was elected to the CPSU Central Auditing Commission.

**Personal Data**

Aleksandrov has the appearance of an ascetic scholar, but he is an engaging conversationalist with a pleasant and outgoing personality. He speaks French and three Scandinavian languages, as well as flawless English and German. He enjoys ballet.

Aleksandrov is married. His wife, Anna Vasil'yevna, a Foreign Ministry employee, was born in 1920. The Aleksandrovs have two daughters, born in 1945 and 1953 respectively. The younger daughter, Viktoriya, is a researcher at the Institute of the International Workers' Movement. She served as a guide with a Soviet youth delegation that toured the United States in 1973. In 1974 she was writing a thesis on the American trade union movement.

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**USSR** **Vladimir Sergeyevich ALKHIMOV**

***Chairman of the Board, State Bank***

*(1976)*

A leading figure in the Ministry of Foreign Trade for over a decade, Vladimir Alkhimov (pronounced ahl-HEEmuf) was appointed chairman of the State Bank of the USSR (Gosbank) in October 1976. The appointment came as a surprise to some Soviet and international business and banking figures, who had long expected him to succeed either Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolay Patolichev or the elderly First Deputy Minister Mikhail Kuz'min. As Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade since 1967, Alkhimov had been responsible for the international financial aspects of foreign trade, including oversight of the Ministry's Main Foreign Exchange Administration and of the Foreign Trade Bank (Vneshtorgbank). He played the leading role in negotiations with West European countries and Japan for massive state credits during 1974 and 1975.

**Proponent of US-Soviet Ties**

Alkhimov has been cochairman of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council and a member of the US-USSR Joint Commercial Commission. A "softliner" on US-Soviet economic relations, Alkhimov has been an outspoken proponent of expanded trade with the United States. He told a US business executive in 1975 that most-favored-nation status was important, "but not that important," and that the key economic issue was the volume of credits allowed the USSR. A few months later, Alkhimov admitted to a visiting US congressman that the Soviet Union was not gaining anything by its policy of restricting emigration and that it should be abandoned.

Alkhimov has dealt frequently with US officials, both in Moscow and the United States. During May-June 1973 he came to this country to aid in the arrangements for the visit of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev. At the same time Alkhimov took part in the negotiations that led to the signing of a US-USSR Convention on Taxation and that resulted in an agreement with the US Export-Import Bank to extend more than $180 million in credits to the USSR. He has visited Washington, D.C., twice (1974 and 1975) in his role as cochairman of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council. In September and October 1975 he served on the Soviet negotiating team that met with US officials in Moscow

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and concluded a new 5-year trade agreement. He met again with Americans at the Marine Cargo Insurance Talks in London in June 1976. In November 1976 he held talks with then Treasury Secretary William Simon in Moscow prior to a Trade and Economic Council meeting.

### Early Life and Career

Vladimir Sergeyevich Alkhimov was born on 25 October 1919 in what is now Smolensk Oblast in the Russian Republic. He graduated from the Smolensk Financial and Economic Technical School in 1938, after which he attended the Leningrad Financial and Economic Institute until the outbreak of World War II. During the war he served as an artillery officer on various fronts. He was made a Hero of the Soviet Union in 1945.

After the war Alkhimov decided on a career in foreign trade; he enrolled in the Foreign Trade Academy and graduated in 1950. For the next 7 years he served as a deputy director of the Scientific Institute for Market Research under the Ministry of Foreign Trade. In 1956, then an advocate of reform of the Soviet price system, he published an article that helped initiate public discussion of this subject. At about the same time he wrote his doctoral dissertation on the banking system in the United Kingdom. During 1956 he also served as a member of the editorial board of the Soviet journal *World Economics and International Relations*.

Alkhimov did not take a position in the Soviet foreign trade apparatus until December 1957, when he was posted to Washington, D.C., as Commercial Counselor. Upon his return from the United States in October 1960, he was assigned as chief of the Ministry's Foreign Exchange Administration. In 1963 he joined the council of Vneshtorgbank.

Alkhimov, who travels widely in the course of his duties, has attended a variety of UN-related foreign trade meetings. He has written extensively on world trade; in a recent article he stressed the value of new methods in foreign trade and economic relations.

### Personal Data

A refined and pleasant person with a sense of humor, Alkhimov has a sharp mind and a good memory. During luncheons and banquets he drinks little and follows all conversations carefully. American officials consider him to be a man who will energetically support those projects in which he believes. Alkhimov is married. Both he and his wife, Antonina, speak English fluently. They have two daughters and one grandchild.

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1 April 1977





**USSR** **Aleksey Konstantinovich ANTONOV**

***Minister of the Electrical Equipment Industry***

*(1974)*

Since 1965 Aleksey Antonov (pronounced ahnTOHnuf) has presided over the Soviet Union's expanding electrotechnical industry as Minister of the Electrical Equipment Industry. A respected administrator with a strong engineering background, he oversees a Ministry responsible for a wide range of electrical equipment, particularly that related to the generation and transmission of electric power. His articles on Ministry operations have appeared widely in the Soviet press, and he has been publicly candid about both the Ministry's successes and its shortcomings. Antonov has been a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) since 1940 and a voting member of the CPSU Central Committee since 1971.

The Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry occupies a leading role in the Soviet economy. Its progress in the development and production of large-scale electrical equipment determines, in large measure, the rate at which industrial expansion takes place, particularly in the developing Siberian and Central Asian areas. Under Antonov's leadership, improvement of conventional electrotechnical equipment has proceeded alongside research in exotic power systems using superconductor and electron beam technology. Antonov's realistic evaluation of Soviet technical competence has also resulted in extensive contact with Western firms to provide the additional technical input and materials needed to fulfill Ministry objectives.

### Early Life and Career

Aleksey Konstantinovich Antonov was born on 8 June 1912 in Grodno in Belorussia. The son of a teacher, Antonov worked as a mechanic during the early 1930's. He graduated from the Leningrad Polytechnical Institute in 1935. From 1937 until 1957 Antonov worked successively as an engineer, head of a laboratory, a deputy chief designer, a shop and production chief and a chief engineer at plants in the aviation industry. When former Premier Nikita Khrushchev abolished most Ministries in 1957 in favor of the regional councils of the national economy (*sovnarkhozy*), Antonov was appointed to the prestigious Leningrad *Sovnarkhoz*. He served there as chief engineer (1957-59), deputy chairman (1959-61) and chairman (1961-65). He was also a member of the bureau of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee during 1961-

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64 and a nonvoting member of the CPSU Central Committee from 1961 to 1971. Antonov was appointed to his current position when Khrushchev's successors restored the ministerial system in 1965. In 1974 Antonov was elected Chairman of the Council of International Organizations for Economic and Scientific Research Cooperation in the Electrical Engineering Industry (Interelektro).

### Travel

Since becoming Minister in 1965, Antonov has led Soviet electrotechnical delegations to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania. Outside the Communist bloc, he has visited India (1964 and 1969), France (1967) and Japan (1975). Antonov visited the United States only once: In 1970 he led a Soviet delegation touring electrical equipment production facilities.

### Personal Data

Antonov's personal qualities have been significant factors in his successful career. Confident, energetic and forceful, he projects a healthy, robust appearance. One US Embassy official noted Antonov's succinct and "rapid-fire" manner of speaking. Antonov is married. He is not known to speak English. Among his awards are a Stalin Prize, third class (1950—for developing new automatic measuring instruments), the Order of the Badge of Honor (1957), two Orders of Lenin and the Order of the October Revolution (1976). He has been a Deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet since 1962.

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1 April 1977





USSR

## Eduard Asaturovich AYKAZYAN

*Chief, USA Section, Foreign Relations Administration, State Committee for Science and Technology*

*(1975)*

Eduard Aykazyan (pronounced eyekuhzYAHN) joined the Foreign Relations Administration of the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT) in 1972. As deputy chief (1972-73) and now chief of the USA Section, he has been a frequent contact for visiting American scientific and commercial delegations. A skillful negotiator, Aykazyan is currently charged with the day-to-day administration of scientific and technical exchanges conducted under the joint US-USSR cooperative agreement signed in 1972. His duties range from such mundane matters as arranging hotel accommodations for visiting American delegations to such important tasks as negotiating the purchase of sophisticated American equipment and technology.

Frequently Aykazyan is called upon to smooth the ruffled feathers of both American and Soviet exchange delegates because of seemingly impossible bureaucratic obstacles and delays on both sides in implementing research programs. Anxious to establish good working relationships with his American counterparts, he has pledged to try to eliminate red tape on the Soviet side and to reply quickly and forthrightly to American requests to visit Soviet research facilities.

### High-Level Connections

During his service as chief of the USA Section, Aykazyan has developed a close personal and working relationship with influential GKNT Deputy Chairman Dzherman Gvishiani. The son-in-law of Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin, Gvishiani has played a key role in establishing technical and commercial exchange agreements with the United States. According to US officials, Aykazyan has been given progressively more authority by his mentor, and he frequently prepares briefing papers for Gvishiani prior to formal negotiating sessions.

Aykazyan is always cognizant of the political undertones of formal scientific and technical negotiations. He adroitly avoids questions that would

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compromise the S[illegible]t bargaining position, and he is reluctant to discuss new areas of specialized cooperation without the approval of his superiors. Well-versed in State Committee policies and procedures, Aykazyan is usually quick to point out that the committee plays a leading role in selecting projects to be included in the joint US-USSR exchange agreement, and that new programs cannot be implemented under this cooperative umbrella without GKNT approval.

### Early Life and Career

Eduard Asaturovich Aykazyan was born on 7 October 1928 in the Armenian city of Leninakan. Little is known of his early career. A chemical engineer by training, he published numerous articles on electrochemistry from Moscow State University during 1954-59 and from the Institute of Organic Chemistry in Yerevan during 1960-65. He holds a candidate of chemical sciences degree.

In January 1967 Aykazyan entered the Soviet diplomatic service as an adviser to the Soviet Trade Representation in London. His service in the United Kingdom, however, was terminated in September 1971, when he was included in a large group of official Soviet personnel expelled by the British Government for alleged intelligence activities. Aykazyan joined the State Committee for Science and Technology upon his return to the Soviet capital.

Aykazyan has participated in meetings of the Joint US-USSR Commission on Cooperation in Science and Technology since March 1973, when he accompanied Vladimir Trapeznikov, GKNT First Deputy Chairman, to the United States for the first meeting of the joint commission. Since then Aykazyan has visited the United States three times, most recently in April 1975 to attend meetings of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council, held in New York.

### Personal Data

Aykazyan is married. His wife's name is Admina Karopetovna. US officials have commented that he has an eye for the ladies. He speaks English fluently, although he has been known to feign ignorance of the language during politically awkward discussions.

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1 April 1977





USSR

## Ivan Ivanovich BODYUL

*First Secretary, Central Committee, Communist Party of Moldavia*

(1975)

Agricultural specialist Ivan Bodyul (pronounced BODEyool) has been first secretary of the Communist Party of Moldavia since May 1961. His career and that of Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), crossed paths during the early 1950's, when Brezhnev was Moldavian first secretary and Bodyul headed one of the district Party committees. Bodyul is known today as one of the General Secretary's staunchest supporters—a reputation that was enhanced in 1971, when he publicly described Brezhnev as the "leader of the Communist Party and the State." (Nikolay Podgornyy, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, is titular Chief of State.)

### Agricultural Innovator

Moldavia's economy is principally agricultural, and Bodyul—despite a conservative orientation in other areas—has been one of the Soviet Union's most innovative leaders in agricultural administration. In 1969 he proposed the creation of locally elected, producer-oriented collective farm councils as an alternative to the existing centrally controlled agricultural bureaucracy, a proposal that has since been fully implemented in Moldavia. During the 1970's he started organizing agro-industrial complexes and production councils of collective and state farms as a means of improving coordination among various agricultural enterprises. In 1973 a stream of interested officials from other areas toured Moldavia to study the republic's collective farm councils and other agricultural innovations; they were personally escorted by Bodyul, who delights in the national attention his innovations have attracted. The republic was accorded high level recognition in June 1976, when a decree of the CPSU Central Committee ordered Party and government organs to accelerate the creation of interfarm associations and agro-industrial complexes. The decree mentioned Bodyul's republic at the head of a list of various regions in the Soviet Union where such experiments have been conducted.

### Ideological Conservative

In contrast to his fresh approach to agriculture, Bodyul's views on other matters have closely followed the established dogma. He has accused the

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Komsomol of being lax in the political education of the young and has urged stronger efforts to infuse them with Soviet patriotism. Bodyul has also been sharply critical of liberal writers; in 1966 he argued that while Soviet literary artists have the right to create what they wish, Party and state organs have the parallel right to print what they wish.

**The Bessarabian Question**

In addition to his other problems, the Moldavian Party chief frequently feels compelled to defend the very existence of his republic. The Moldavian SSR, a part of Russia in the 19th century, was the Romanian province of Bessarabia during 1919-40; it was acquired by the Soviet Union as part of a territorial deal with the Nazis when the German-Soviet nonaggression pact was in effect (1939-41). Romanian leaders today point out the Nazi taint on the deal, but Bodyul has persistently emphasized Moldavia's links to the Russian people and the Soviet State. Foreign observers regard the frequency of his remarks on this sensitive issue as a barometer of the varying level of tension in Soviet-Romanian relations.

**Early Life and Party Career**

Ivan Ivanovich Bodyul was born on 3 January 1918 in the Ukraine. His father was Moldavian and his mother was Russian. He graduated from an agricultural school and later worked briefly as an agronomist at a machine-tractor station. After entering the Soviet Army in 1938, he graduated from a military veterinary academy and then served as chief of veterinary services for a number of large army units. Bodyul joined the CPSU while at the academy.

At the completion of his military service in 1946, Bodyul became an assistant to the chief agricultural administrator under the Moldavian Council of Ministers. He later represented the Moldavian SSR on the USSR Council of Collective Farm Affairs (now defunct), an organization that directed the activities of all government agencies concerned with life on the collective farms.

Bodyul began full time Party work in 1951, serving initially as first secretary of a number of rayon Party committees in Moldavia. In 1958 he received a candidate of philosophical sciences degree from the Higher Party School in Moscow and advanced from membership in the Moldavian Party's Auditing Commission to voting membership in its Central Committee. The following year, after brief service as an instructor in an unspecified department of the CPSU Central Committee, Bodyul was elected a second secretary and Bureau member of the Moldavian Party Central Committee. He became a voting member of the CPSU Central Committee in 1961. He has been a Deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet since 1958.

**Personal Data and Travel**

Bodyul is married. His wife, Klavdiya Petrovna, was born in December 1925. Mrs. Bodyul, according to one report, is quite pretty, looks much





younger than her husband and speaks English fairly well. The Bodyuls have two daughters.

Officials who have traveled through Bodyul's republic describe the first secretary as an intimidating, even frightening administrator who resembles a "US Marine drill sergeant." He is a hard-driving worker, interested in positive results. Bodyul speaks Russian and Romanian, but he is not known to speak English.

Bodyul has traveled extensively throughout Europe. He has also visited Canada, Morocco, Chile and Burma. He holds a number of awards, including two Red Stars, the Badge of Honor and the Order of Lenin.

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1 April 1977

USSR

## Konstantin Ustinovich CHERNENKO

***Secretary, CPSU Central Committee; Chief, General Department, CPSU Central Committee***

*(1976)*

An associate of General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's for more than 20 years, Konstantin Chernenko (pronounced cherNENkuh) has been a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) since March 1976. He also serves as chief of the Central Committee's General Department, a post he assumed in July 1965. Chernenko's responsibilities in the Party Secretariat defy precise definition, but his election to that body probably increased the importance and authority of the General Department, which was already a key link in the CPSU command structure.

### Expediting Policy Decisions

As chief of the General Department, Chernenko oversees the handling of all communications and correspondence generated by the CPSU Politburo and other leading Party organs. One of his chief responsibilities is the shepherding of memoranda, draft speeches, and other important documents through the Party's decisionmaking machinery—no easy task in a system where decisions are so often deferred to the highest levels. Chernenko's department also performs a number of other sensitive functions, including the processing of citizens' complaints to top Party officials, issuing and safeguarding Party membership cards, and maintaining CPSU archival materials.

### Party Historian

In recent years Chernenko has played a leading role in the publication of most collections of official CPSU documents. He was the senior member of the editorial board for *The Party Worker's Guide* (an annual reference work that lists important Party and government documents) from 1966 until 1969, when that duty was shifted to his first deputy, Klavdiy Bogolyubov. One reason for the shift became apparent in 1970, when Chernenko joined Petr Fedoseyev, then director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, as coeditor of *The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, a monumental, multivolume compilation of





Party documents issued since 1898. In 1974 Chernenko was described as "responsible for publication" of a volume of Brezhnev's speeches, a function that in the past had often been performed by the General Secretary's personal aides, and in July 1975 he accompanied Brezhnev to Helsinki, apparently to record proceedings at the final session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

### Early Life and Career

Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko was born on 24 September 1911 in what is now Krasnoyarsk, RSFSR. By the age of 18 he had joined the Komsomol, and soon afterward he became a section chief in one of its rayon-level organizations. Chernenko joined the CPSU in 1931. According to a Soviet biography, he was a Party organization secretary with a military border contingent during the early 1930's and later became a section chief in a rayon Party committee. He was elected a secretary of the Krasnoyarsk Kray Party Committee in 1941, after serving briefly as deputy chief of one of that committee's departments. In 1943 Chernenko moved to Moscow to attend the Higher School of Party Organizers of the CPSU Central Committee. After graduation in 1945 he was elected a secretary of the Penza Oblast (RSFSR) Party Committee. Politburo member Fedor Kulakov headed the Oblast Agricultural Department at that time.

### Ties to Brezhnev

In 1948 Chernenko became chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Moldavian Party Central Committee, a position he retained until 1956. His association with Brezhnev presumably began while he was in that post: Brezhnev was first secretary of the Moldavian Party Central Committee from 1950 to 1952. Chernenko was elected a voting member of the Central Committee in 1949 and was reelected at succeeding Party congresses through 1956. While in Moldavia he received a degree from the Kishinev Pedagogical Institute in 1953.

In 1956 Chernenko was transferred to Moscow as a sector chief in the Department for Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee, an assignment that may have been arranged by Brezhnev, who earlier that year had returned to Moscow as a member of the CPSU Presidium and Secretariat. Chernenko became Brezhnev's executive aide in the Supreme Soviet administrative apparatus in 1960, and in February of the following year he traveled to Guinea, Morocco and Ghana with a delegation headed by Brezhnev. In July 1965, less than a year after Brezhnev's election as CPSU First Secretary, Chernenko was named chief of the Central Committee's General Department. Chernenko was elected a nonvoting member of the CPSU Central Committee in 1966 and a voting member in 1971.

### Visit to the United States

Chernenko is one of only a few Central Committee department chiefs who have visited the United States. He came to this country in April 1974, as

a member of the Soviet delegation to a Special Session of the UN General Assembly. During his stay he also visited the Department of State to observe its office procedures, management tools and automatic data processing systems. US officials who met him on that visit found Chernenko to be an extroverted, unsophisticated individual who readily engaged in small talk. He does not speak English.

**Honors and Awards**

Chernenko has been a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet since 1966. He was awarded the Order of Labor Red Banner in 1949 and 1957 and the Order of Lenin in 1971. In March 1976—only a few days before his election as CPSU Secretary—he was honored for his "great contributions to the Communist Party and Soviet State" with a second Order of Lenin, a Hammer and Sickle Gold Medal and the title of Hero of Socialist Labor.

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JZebatto

1 April 1977





## CHRONOLOGY

USSR — Konstantin Ustinovich CHERNENKO

| | |
|---|---|
| 24 Sep 1911 | Born in what is now Krasnoyarsk, RSFSR. |
| 1929 | Served in rayon-level Komsomol organizations. |
| 1931 | Joined CPSU. |
| c. 1931-c. 35 | Served as Party secretary, unidentified border guards unit. |
| c. 1935 | Appointed chief, unidentified section, rayon Party committee. |
| 1941 | Elected a secretary of Krasnoyarsk Kray Party committee. |
| 1943-45 | Attended Higher School of Party Organizers in Moscow. |
| 1945 | Elected a secretary of Penza Oblast Party Committee. |
| 1948-56 | Served as chief, Propaganda and Agitation Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of Moldavia. |
| 1956-60 | Served as chief, unidentified sector, Propaganda Department, CPSU Central Committee. |
| 1960-65 | Served as chief of Secretariat, Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet. |
| Jul 1965 | Appointed chief, General Department, CPSU Central Committee. |
| Apr 1966 | Elected nonvoting member, CPSU Central Committee. |
| Apr 1971 | Elected voting member, CPSU Central Committee. |
| Mar 1976 | Elected Secretary, CPSU Central Committee. |

USSR

## Leonid Vital'yevich KANTOROVICH

***Head, Problems Laboratory of Economic-Mathematical Methods and Operations Research, Institute of Management of the National Economy***

*(1975)*

An internationally recognized creative genius in the fields of mathematics and the application of electronic computers to economic affairs, Academician Leonid Kantorovich (pronounced kahntuhROHvich) has worked at the Institute of Management of the National Economy since 1971. He has been involved in advanced mathematical research since the age of 15; in 1939 he invented linear programming, one of the most significant contributions to economic management in the twentieth century. Kantorovich has spent most of his adult life battling to win acceptance for his revolutionary concept from Soviet academic and economic bureaucracies; the value of linear programming to Soviet economic practices was not really recognized by his country's authorities until 1965, when Kantorovich was awarded a Lenin Prize for his work. International recognition came in October 1975, when the mathematician was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics jointly with T. C. Koopmans, a Dutch-born American economist who discovered the same concept independently a few years after Kantorovich.

In addition to his mathematical research, Kantorovich has been directly involved in developing improved designs for high-speed digital computers, an activity apparently motivated by the Soviet Union's need for improved computers in solving large economic planning problems.

### The Institute of Management of the National Economy

The Institute of Management of the National Economy was established to train high level economic and industrial administrators in modern methods of management, production organization, and the use of economic-mathematical methods and computers in planning. When the institute opened in early 1971, Premier Aleksey Kosygin and Party Secretary Andrey Kirilenko attended the ceremonies, thus suggesting the importance that the Soviet Government and Party attach to the application of modern management techniques to Soviet industrial administration and economic planning.





### A Note on Linear Programming

Linear programming is a mathematical problem-solving method geared to finding the most productive use of scarce resources. It is well suited for computer applications to economic problems, and in the West—where the study of economics has traditionally been approached as the study of how scarce resources are allocated—linear programming has been widely used since the early 1950's.

In the USSR the concept of economic scarcity was long believed to be applicable only within the class structure of capitalism, and not in Soviet society. Kantorovich has led the effort in the Soviet Union to convince the leadership otherwise. Despite his apparent success, he and his method still have powerful opponents. These are primarily officials connected with the vast economic planning bureaucracy, who fear for their positions should modern methodologies gain widespread use in Soviet economic decision-making.

### Official Favor

Kantorovich is Jewish, but his value to the Soviet state is so great that he has flourished professionally even during the Soviet Union's recurrent surges of official anti-Semitic bias. In 1949, for example, he received a Stalin Prize "for work on functional analysis." According to one report, during another resurgence of anti-Semitism in 1968, Kantorovich was made an economic planning adviser to "the upper levels of the Soviet leadership."

Like all Soviet academicians, Kantorovich enjoys premiums available only to the top members of Soviet society. His Moscow apartment is filled with fine furniture, beautiful china and a large television set, and resembles a picture from a home decorating magazine.

Kantorovich is careful not to jeopardize his position and its perquisites. At meetings with Americans in the USSR, he has always been nervous and excessively cautious in word and action. In 1973 and 1975, however, he was among those academicians who refused to sign Party-sponsored academy decrees condemning dissident physicist Andrey Sakharov.

### Early Start

The son of a doctor, Leonid Vital'yevich Kantorovich was born on 19 January 1912 in St. Petersburg (now Leningrad). In 1926, at the age of 14, he entered the Mathematics Department of the Physical Mathematical Faculty of Leningrad State University (LGU); he began his first research work a year later. After graduating in 1930, the teenage Kantorovich began teaching at the Leningrad Institute of Industrial Construction Engineers. In 1932 he returned to LGU to take on a second teaching post. Within 2 years he had become a full professor, and in 1935 he received his doctorate in physics and mathematics without having to defend a thesis. By that time (at the age of 23) he had about 40 professional publications to his credit.

Except for the years 1941-44, Kantorovich remained a professor at LGU until 1960. He was, however, affiliated with other organizations during that period. He left the Leningrad Institute of Industrial Construction Engineers in 1939 to become head of a department at the Moscow Higher Engineering-Technical School *imeni* Bauman; he held that job until 1948. He also taught at the Leningrad Branch of the Mathematical Institute *imeni* Steklov, of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in 1940 and 1941. In 1945 he rejoined the Steklov Institute as head of its Department of Approximate Computations. In 1960, the same year he left LGU, Kantorovich gave up his job at the Steklov Institute and moved to Novosibirsk with a group of mathematical economists he had trained in Leningrad.

Kantorovich served in Novosibirsk until 1971 as assistant director of the Mathematics Institute of the Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences and as the head of that institute's Mathematical Economics Department. He also worked as head of the Department of Numerical Mathematics of Novosibirsk State University's Faculty of Mathematics and Mechanics and as a corresponding member of the university's Economics Faculty. By the time he was assigned to his present position, Kantorovich had produced almost 200 publications.

Kantorovich was elected a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1958 and an active member in 1964. Formally a member of the academy's Mathematics Department, Kantorovich participates in the work of the Economics Department.

### Travel

Academician Kantorovich has attended several international meetings in Europe on mathematics and economics, including meetings held in Budapest (1963), London (1964 and 1966) and Warsaw (1966). He was allowed by the Soviet Government to travel to Stockholm in 1975 to receive his Nobel Prize. He has never visited the United States.

### Personal Data

Kantorovich speaks English poorly and relies on an interpreter during meetings with Americans. He is married. His wife, Nataliya Vladimirovna, born in 1910, is a medical doctor. In addition to his Stalin and Lenin Prizes, Kantorovich has been awarded a number of orders and medals, including the Order of Lenin in 1967 for his work in developing the Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences in Novosibirsk. He holds honorary doctoral degrees from several foreign universities and is an honorary member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Budapest) and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Boston).

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1 April 1977





**USSR**

## Aleksandr Akimovich ISHKOV

***Minister of the Fish Industry***

(1974)

Aleksandr Ishkov (pronounced ish-KOFF) has been a leading administrator of the Soviet fishing industry since 1939. He has held ministerial rank or its equivalent for over 30 years. He was named Minister of the Fish Industry for the third time in his career in October 1965. Ishkov has survived periods of severe public criticism, and he continues to head an industry that now employs some 700,000 people and uses 18,000 ships. He has been a nonvoting member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee since 1956.

### Expanding Operations

During the past decade, the Soviet fishing industry has steadily expanded the scope of its operations. This expansion has been accomplished in part through agreements with many less-developed countries, by which Moscow provides credits and grants in exchange for concessions for its shipping fleet and repair facilities. Such measures have allowed the USSR to explore new waters, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere, at a time when 200-mile economic zones and conservation agreements are beginning to restrict Soviet activities in more traditional fishing areas.

### Early Life

Aleksandr Akimovich Ishkov was born on 30 August 1905 in Stavropol, located between the Black and Caspian Seas. At the age of 14 he served as an apprentice in an electrical shop where he later became assistant foreman. During 1924-30 Ishkov served as secretary of the agitation and propaganda department of a local Party committee and as secretary of a Komsomol committee.

### Fishing for a Career

Detailed information on Ishkov during his early career is lacking, but all Soviet biographies agree that in 1930, at age 25, he forsook any interest he may have had in Party work and began his long career in the fish industry. It is not known how he developed an interest in that field; perhaps his early Party and Komsomol responsibilities were in a region adjacent to the sea. At any rate, during the 1930's he worked in local and union organizations of the

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fish industry and directed several fish trusts. All of Ishkov's early administrative positions were concentrated in the Black Sea area, probably in Krasnodar Kray; he served as deputy chairman of the North Caucasus Fisherman's Union, as chairman of the Kuban Fisherman's Union, as head of the Azov-Black Sea Main Fishing Trust, and finally as manager of the Volgo-Caspian Trust.

Ishkov, like many other young men of the period whose loyalty to then Premier Iosif Stalin seemed unquestioned, rose quickly into a government bureaucracy depleted by Stalin's purges. By 1939 he had become Deputy People's Commissar of the Fish Industry for the Western Regions. One year later the 35-year-old Ishkov was promoted to People's Commissar—in effect, the government's top fish industry administrator and equivalent to the post he holds today. He retained that position throughout World War II, and when people's commissariats were abolished in favor of ministries, Ishkov was named Minister of the Fish Industry for the Western Regions.

Between 1946 and 1948 there were two fish industry ministries, but after their reunification in 1948 Ishkov again took over as administrative head. In 1950, however, he was demoted to Deputy Minister, responsible for the Azov-Black Sea region, possibly because of his Ministry's reported failure to meet production quotas. Following Stalin's death in 1953, there was another governmental reorganization, which eliminated the Fish Ministry; Ishkov became First Deputy Minister of the Food Industry. After the Ministry of the Fish Industry was reconstituted in 1954, Ishkov's leading role in that Ministry was never successfully challenged. Between that year and 1965, he served successively , through several more governmental reorganizations, in three posts which probably involved him in similar responsibilities: Minister of the Fish Industry (1954-57), head of the Fisheries Department of the State Planning Committee (1957-62), and Chairman of the State Committee for the Fish Industry (1962-65). In October 1965 he assumed his present position.

### Public Criticism

Ishkov has managed to survive periodic public censure since 1941. He has been criticized for failing to meet planned goals, and at the same time, Soviet conservationists and fishermen have taken him to task for depleting natural resources in Soviet waters. In 1970 Ishkov was sharply criticized in the press for spending 50 million rubles on the construction of the *Vostok*, then one of the largest Soviet fishing vessels, carrying a 600 man crew. For that amount the Soviets could have built 15 or 16 large stern-trawlers producing several times more useful catch than the *Vostok*.

### Negotiating Style

American businessmen who met with Ishkov during the 1960's described him as an effective Soviet spokesman—capable, aggressive, tactful and frank. In 1973 Ishkov seemed to be more an implementer than an originator of





policies. During negotiations with foreign officials he waved aside an issue, characterizing it as political and therefore beyond his competence to decide.

### Personal Data and Travel

Ishkov is fond of Georgian wines and is able to consume large quantities of alcohol with no apparent ill effects. He is married and has three children—two daughters and a son. Ishkov suffered a mild heart attack in 1965 and was hospitalized for an undisclosed ailment in late 1972. In early 1973, while on an inspection tour of Soviet fishing bases, he was forced by illness to postpone a visit to Spain. As a negotiator of the Soviet Union's many fishing agreements, Minister Ishkov travels extensively to meet with his counterparts in other countries. He has visited the United States three times—twice in 1958 and once in 1971 while in transit between Chile and Canada.

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1 April 1977

**USSR** **Mikhail Stepanovich KAPITSA**

***Chief, First Far Eastern Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs***

*(1969)*

Since 1970 Mikhail Kapitsa (pronounced KAHpitsah) has been chief of the First Far Eastern Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a member of the Ministry's policy-making Collegium. A senior Soviet expert on China, he has specialized in Asian affairs during his more than 20-year diplomatic career. He previously directed the Foreign Ministry's Southeast Asian Department (1966-70), and during 1960-61 he was Ambassador to Pakistan. Kapitsa is currently responsible for China, Korea and Mongolia. In his role as a Collegium member, he coordinates general policy questions handled by the other three Asian departments in the Foreign Ministry.

**Professional Diplomat and Scholar**

More articulate than most other Soviet officials, with a free-wheeling personal style, Kapitsa often gives the impression that he is expressing something more than the official stand on issues. He is a physically imposing man—almost 2 meters tall—with an authoritative and sometimes explosive manner. Extremely self-confident, he is often expansive and bantering during discussions with US officials, as he presents his views regarding China and Chinese matters. Kapitsa is one of the Soviet Union's most voluble Asian experts, outspoken and overdramatic but worth listening to, according to foreign officials.

Doctor of Historical Sciences Kapitsa has combined an academic career with his diplomatic work. In 1961 he became a professor at the Institute of Oriental Languages at Moscow State University. He serves on the editorial board of the journal *Problems of the Far East*, and he has been a prolific author of books and articles on China. Kapitsa often writes under pseudonyms, one of which is "M. Ukraintsev." In 1968 he wrote *To the Left of Common Sense*, in which he surveyed the development of the Maoist line since 1949. In that publication he described the increasingly anti-Soviet posture of the Chinese leadership and asserted that China was the Soviet Union's main problem. In 1969 Kapitsa published a bitter attack on China entitled *PRC: Two Decades, Two Policies*. Kapitsa has been nominated several times for corresponding membership in the USSR Academy of Sciences but has not been elected.





**Early Life and Career**

Mikhail Stepanovich Kapitsa was born on 5 November 1921 in Yurkovtsy (now Mogilev-Podol'skiy), in the Ukraine. He graduated from the Institute of Foreign Languages in 1941 and joined the diplomatic service 2 years later. From about 19[illegible] to 1946 he served as a Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in China and studied at a Chinese university. Kapitsa graduated from the Higher Diplomatic School in Moscow in 1948. During the next 6 years he presumably worked on Asian affairs in the Foreign Ministry. By 1954, when he served as an expert in the Soviet delegation to the Geneva Conference on Asia, he had acquired the diplomatic rank of first secretary. Kapitsa worked in the Ministry's Far Eastern Department from at least 1954 to 1960, serving as deputy department chief during 1956-60. In 1957 and 1958 he traveled to the United States to attend sessions of the UN General Assembly.

**Ambassador to Pakistan**

Kapitsa's next assignment, as Ambassador to Pakistan, was short (1960-61) but eventful. He fell out of favor with the host government on the day he arrived when, in a press interview, he antagonized the Pakistani Foreign Minister. In a subsequent confrontation with the Foreign Minister, he refused to apologize and was almost declared *persona non grata* after only a week at his post. During the next year and a half, he attempted to ingratiate himself with Pakistani officials, but most of his proposals for economic aid were rejected, and his own travel within the country was restricted. While in Karachi, Kapitsa also tried to cultivate American diplomats, who found him to be charming despite his maneuverings.

Returning to Moscow, Kapitsa took up a dual academic and diplomatic career as a member of the Institute of Oriental Languages and as a counselor in the Foreign Ministry's Far Eastern Department. He was named chief of the Southeast Asian Department in 1966. During the next 5 years he made several fact-finding visits to Southeast Asia, and in September 1969 he traveled with Premier Aleksey Kosygin to Peking to meet with then Premier Chou En-lai. In 1970 the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Ministry was reorganized to accommodate expanding Soviet relations with Japan. Kapitsa was named to head the new First Far Eastern Department, which handles China, Korea and Mongolia.

**Personal Data**

The Ambassador speaks French and fluent English and Chinese. He enjoys physical exercise; during his tour in Karachi, he swam regularly and often went fishing. In April 1970 he reportedly suffered a stroke and was hospitalized; at least until that time Kapitsa had been a relatively heavy drinker and chain-smoked cigars. Kapitsa is married. His wife, Lidiya Ilinichna, is from Uzbekistan. In the early 1960's she was described as attractive, socially adept and stylishly dressed in Western fashions. The

Kapitsas have a son, born about 1949, and a daughter, Larisa, born in 1944. Larisa graduated from the Institute of International Relations in 1967 and in 1970 was in Cairo doing research for a graduate thesis on the economies of Arab countries.

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1 April 1977





USSR

## Nikolay Timofeyevich GLUSHKOV

*Chairman, State Committee for Prices*

(1975)

Nikolay Glushkov (pronounced glooshKOFF), a former administrator of the Soviet nonferrous metallurgical industry, was made Chairman of the State Committee for Prices in August 1975. The post had been vacant for over a year; his predecessor, Vladimir Sitnin, had been released in mid-1974. Glushkov may be a protégé of Vladimir Dolgikh, a Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Secretary for heavy industry, with whom he served in the Krasnoyarsk region of the USSR during the 1960's.

The responsibility of the State Committee is to establish prices, in coordination with the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), for the main products of heavy industry, for major types of food and clothing and for certain other consumer goods. The Committee was set up in 1965 in connection with a national economic reform that sought, among other things, to rely more heavily on prices as a stimulus toward greater economic efficiency, technological progress and higher product quality. Initially attached to Gosplan, the State Committee for Prices was upgraded to direct subordination to the Council of Ministers in late 1969.

### Service in Siberia

Nothing is currently known concerning Glushkov's education or early career; even his age is unrecorded. He was first identified in the Soviet press in 1961 as deputy chairman of the Krasnoyarsk (Central Siberia) Council of the National Economy (*sovnarkhoz*), part of a system of regional economic supervisory bodies that existed during 1957-65. Glushkov served on the Krasnoyarsk *Sovnarkhoz* until at least 1964, by which time he had become its first deputy chairman. During this period he was probably associated with Dolgikh, who then worked in the Krasnoyarsk region as director of the Noril'sk Mining and Metallurgical Combine.

By 1968 Glushkov had moved to Moscow and had become chief of the Main Economic Planning Administration of the Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy. In 1974 he was made a Deputy Minister. In that capacity he met at least three times with representatives of US firms for talks on joint metallurgical projects in the Soviet Union. These projects included the

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proposed construction of an alumina plant in northern Kazakhstan or on the Kola peninsula, an aluminum smelter near Krasnoyarsk and a sulfur dioxide reduction facility at a copper smelter in Noril'sk.

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USSR

## Georgiy Arkad'yevich KARAVAYEV

*Minister of Construction*

*(1974)*

Georgiy Karavayev (pronounced kahrahVAHyef), a career construction bureaucrat, has been Minister of Construction since 1967. Karavayev first attained the rank of Deputy Minister in the early 1950's and later served twice (1953-61, 1963-67) as the number-two man in the State Committee for Construction Affairs (Gosstroy). A member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) since 1940, he became a voting member of its Central Committee in 1976.

Supervising a total work force of over a half million people, Karavayev works in one of the weakest and most inefficient sectors of his country's economy. The Soviet construction industry is fraught with problems such as delayed projects, low managerial skills, careless workmanship, poor quality materials and irregular delivery of supplies to construction sites. The Minister's problems in this area are compounded by the organizational morass in which he must work. In addition to Karavayev's Ministry, construction is carried on by eight other ministries (the Ministries of Industrial Construction, Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises, Rural Construction, Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises, Transport Construction, Power and Electrification, Installation and Special Construction Work, and Land Reclamation and Water Resources). Directing and supplementing the work of those ministries is the task of Gosstroy.

The division of responsibility among Soviet construction agencies is obscure. For example, the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of Industrial Construction and the Ministry of Rural Construction all build grain elevators. Residential housing has been built by the Ministry of Industrial Construction, hospitals have been built by the Ministry of Transport Construction, coal mines by the Ministry of Construction, and kindergartens by the Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises.

In an environment so open to bureaucratic infighting and empire building, Karavayev has at least held his own; despite his industry's pervasive shortcomings, he has managed to retain his post for a decade. In 1971 he assumed his first Party responsibilities when he was elected a nonvoting member of the CPSU Central Committee. Two years later he was given the Order of Lenin on his 60th birthday "for services to the Soviet State."

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### Education and Early Career

Georgiy Arkad'yevich Karavayev was born on 3 April 1913 in St. Petersburg (now Leningrad). He began working at the age of 16. After graduating from the Leningrad Institute of Water Transport Engineering in 1935, he entered the construction trade. Between 1937 and 1951 he worked with an unidentified construction trust, rising from the post of work superintendent to that of director of the trust.

In 1940 Karavayev joined the Communist Party during a campaign to recruit loyal Stalinists into the Party's ranks, which had been depleted by the great purge of the 1930's. His activities during World War II are not a matter of record, but his official Soviet biography gives no indication that his construction career was interrupted.

In 1951 Karavayev became chief of the Main Administration for Construction of Industrial Establishments in the Southern Regions, under the Ministry of Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises. By the following year he had become a Deputy Minister. In 1954 he was made Deputy Minister of Construction of Metallurgical and Chemical Industry Enterprises. In the same year he was sent to Warsaw to supervise construction of the Iosif Stalin Palace of Culture and Science, which, after completion, was regarded by Western critics as one of the most hideous examples of the "Stalin Gothic" style of Soviet architecture.

### Regional Duties: A Possible Kirilenko Connection

In 1957 Karavayev left his job in Moscow to become deputy chairman for construction affairs of the Sverdlovsk *Sovnarkhoz* (Council of the National Economy), a regional economic supervisory organization that was part of a national network of such organizations during 1957-65, when the construction ministries were abolished. Karavayev held this job for 2 years, during which time he may have established connections with Andrey Kirilenko, chairman of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Party Committee during 1955-62. Kirilenko is now a CPSU Central Committee Secretary and heir apparent to CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.

### Return to the Center

Karavayev returned to Moscow in 1959 to become First Deputy Chairman of Gosstroy. In late 1961 he was assigned as chairman of the All-Union Bank for Financing Capital Investments; with that post he attained the personal rank of Minister. In 1963 he was reassigned as First Deputy Chairman of Gosstroy. In 1965 the Soviet government withdrew ministerial rank from those officials (Karavayev among them) who did not head ministries. He regained the title of Minister with his 1967 promotion to Minister of Construction. Karavayev has been a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet since 1970.





### Travel and Awards

Karavayev has traveled frequently in the course of his duties. In 1965 he visited the United States as head of a delegation to study the production of reinforced concrete. In addition to the Order of Lenin that he received in 1973, Karavayev holds one that he earned in 1955 for his work in Warsaw. He also has received a Stalin Prize (1950) and an Order of Labor Red Banner (1963).

### Personal Data

When Karavayev visited the United States in 1965, he seemed to be a competent engineer and a man of great energy. An avid conversationalist, he never hesitated to voice his opinions, frequently seeming rude and abrupt to his American hosts. According to one American, however, Karavayev could "turn on the charm" when necessary. The Minister has two sons, born circa 1945 and circa 1947 respectively. The Minister does not speak English.

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USSR

## Georgiy Markovich KORNIYENKO

***Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs***

(1977)

In October 1975 Georgiy Korniyenko (pronounced kurnihYENkuh), chief of the Foreign Ministry's USA Department since 1966 and a member of the Ministry's policymaking Collegium since at least 1968, was promoted to Deputy Foreign Minister. He is now one of ten deputies. He continues, however, to deal exclusively with US affairs, and his promotion seems to indicate the importance the Soviet leadership attaches to its relationship with Washington and to reflect high regard for Korniyenko.

Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semenov, head of the Soviet delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), has described Korniyenko as a man "strong in battle" who wields more influence than his post as department head would suggest. Korniyenko is said to be respected by the Communist Party's Politburo and Central Committee leaders for his grasp of American affairs. There have been indications that Korniyenko has been actively involved in internal Soviet SALT deliberations.

Korniyenko, who speaks English well, has been dealing with US officials since his tour (1960-65) at the Embassy in Washington. He has participated in every US-Soviet summit meeting since 1972 and was frequently present during meetings between Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko and then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Soviet colleagues have stated that Korniyenko considers US-Soviet relations to be a serious competition in which policy changes are determined by national interests and each country seeks to improve its position without expecting to win unilateral concessions.

Korniyenko is a sober and logical man who is able to recognize valid information and analysis. In 1969, when he was assigned to the Soviet SALT delegation, Ambassador to the United States Anatoliy Dobrynin described him as taciturn but as someone who would understand the statements of his US counterparts at SALT. Understanding or not, Korniyenko can be a tough negotiator. US officials, after a substantive conversation with him in 1974, described him as being "his usual cantankerous self" on a number of issues.







### Early Life and Career

Georgiy Markovich Korniyenko was born on 13 February 1925. He served in the Soviet Army during the period 1943-47 and may have seen combat in his native Ukraine. Little information is available on Korniyenko's career from 1947, when he joined the Foreign Service, until he was posted to Washington as an Embassy Counselor in 1960. He served as an adviser on the Soviet delegations to the Geneva Conference on Asia (1954) and to the 14th Session of the UN General Assembly in New York (1959). Korniyenko says that he completed a course in law at Moscow State University shortly before receiving his US assignment.

During his 5-year tour of duty in Washington, Korniyenko attained the diplomatic rank of Minister and served as Chargé d'Affaires during the absences of Ambassador Dobrynin. (His former chief, Dobrynin, is now responsible to Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko for reporting on the United States.) His initial job at the Embassy was to follow US Congressional affairs and general domestic matters. By 1962, however, he had apparently become the Embassy's expert on disarmament. He often traveled to various parts of the United States for speaking engagements. Korniyenko returned to Moscow in 1965 to become deputy chief of the Foreign Ministry's USA Department, and in early 1966 he was promoted to department chief.

Since at least 1969 Korniyenko has held the rank of Ambassador. He was a principal delegate to the preliminary session of SALT Phase I, held in Helsinki during November-December 1969. In 1973 he was a member of the Soviet delegation to the Paris Conference on Vietnam. He returns regularly to the United States to attend sessions of the UN General Assembly.

### Personal Data

Since at least 1967 the Ambassador has periodically been in ill health; in that year he appeared unwell, and a colleague said he suffered from high blood pressure and a heart condition. High blood pressure and a kidney stone attack forced Korniyenko's early return from Helsinki in December 1969 and the cancellation of his planned participation in subsequent SALT meetings. He was again absent from his job for several weeks early in 1976, and his chronic health problems probably affect his prospects for assignments abroad.

In addition to being a scholar of American affairs, Korniyenko is an able administrator. He is not comfortable in social relationships with Americans and finds it difficult to engage in small talk, especially with women.

The Ambassador is married. His wife, Lenyana Nikolayevna, was ill in the mid-1960's and may have suffered a nervous breakdown. The Korniyenkos have two sons: Aleksandr, born in 1953, and Andrey, who was born in Washington in 1961.

CIA/DDI/OCR
KDavis

1 April 1977

USSR

## Aleksey Nikolayevich MANZHULO

*Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade*

(1974)

Aleksey Manzhulo (pronounced munZHOOluh) has been a Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade since August 1970. He had previously served in the Ministry since 1962 as chief of the Administration for Trade with Western Countries. One of ten Deputy Ministers, he oversees general trade matters relating to Western Europe, Africa, North and South America and international economic organizations. He is also responsible for overseeing bilateral trade agreements with capitalist countries. With such wide geographic responsibilities, Manzhulo has traveled frequently to countries throughout the world.

### Contacts with Americans

Manzhulo's efforts to promote Soviet-American relations date from 1959, when he supervised a Soviet scientific and cultural exhibition in New York City, personally escorting then President Dwight Eisenhower through the Soviet pavilion. Four years later Manzhulo visited the United States as part of a wheat purchasing delegation. Throughout 1972 he participated in meetings of the US-USSR Trade Agreement Working Group, and he traveled to the United States twice that year (January and September) for negotiations with US Government officials.

In February 1975 Manzhulo headed the Soviet delegation to the first meeting in Moscow of the US-USSR Working Group of Experts, established in 1974 to facilitate economic, industrial and technical cooperation. Two months later he accompanied then Treasury Secretary William Simon during the latter's visit to the Soviet Union to attend the meeting of the Joint Commercial Commission. In August Manzhulo met in the United States with officials of the Soviet American Trading (Satra) Corporation, an American-owned firm that promotes trade with the USSR. The Deputy Minister also attended United Nations General Assembly sessions in April 1974 and September 1975.

### Views on Soviet-US Trade

A US businessman characterized Manzhulo in 1975 as being among those Soviet trade officials who are most enthusiastic about commercial relations with the West. In April 1976 Manzhulo wrote an article in *Sovetskaya Rossiya*





entitled "The Materialization of Détente," in which he defended détente and increased economic relations with "capitalist states." In the article he complained of US Export-Import Bank credit restrictions and the denial of most-favored-nation status to the USSR, but he concluded, nevertheless, that the "implementation of détente is the most important demand of our time, and our country will patiently and consistently seek ever new ways" to promote it.

### Early Life

Aleksey Nikolayevich Manzhulo was born on 15 September 1913 in Lugansk, in what is now the Ukrainian SSR. According to his own account, his parents were factory workers who were Communist Party members before the November 1917 Bolshevik takeover. His father died in 1941. Details of Manzhulo's early life are obscure. He has told Western diplomats that he drove a John Deere tractor during the 1929 grain harvest. He graduated from a Moscow mechanical engineering institute in 1936 and then worked in Moscow as an automotive engineer. During World War II he attended the Foreign Trade Academy, where he learned English.

### Postwar Career in Foreign Trade

In May 1945 Manzhulo was sent to the United States via Alaska, for a short tour with the Soviet Purchasing Commission. Three other foreign assignments followed: Deputy Trade Representative in the United Kingdom during 1948-51, Commercial Representative in Buenos Aires from 1953 to 1957 and employee of the Soviet Trade Representation in Havana from early 1961 to July 1962. Between those tours he worked at the Ministry of Foreign Trade headquarters in Moscow as deputy chief of an unidentified department (1951-53) and as deputy chief of the Administration for Trade with Countries of People's Democracies (1957-circa 1961).

### Personal Data

One American official has described Manzhulo as an extraordinarily engaging and sophisticated individual; other US representatives agree that he is a confident and effective negotiator. An outdoorsman, he likes hunting, fishing and hiking. He is also fond of Greek music and is a fan of Greek actress Melina Mercouri. Manzhulo has been married twice. His first wife, Berta, died in 1955 during childbirth. He has a daughter from that marriage, Marina, who was born in 1945 in New York. Manzhulo's present wife, Nadezhda, a physician, is rarely seen at Moscow diplomatic functions. The couple has a son, born about 1965. Manzhulo speaks excellent English and Spanish and some French.

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1 April 1977

**USSR** **Igor' Dmitriyevich MOROKHOV**

***First Deputy Chairman, State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy***

(1974)

Doctor of Technical Sciences Igor' Morokhov (pronounced MORuhkuf) is a leading administrator and chief spokesman for the Soviet domestic and international civilian atomic energy programs. He has been First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy (GKAE) since joining it in 1960, and he has served as the Soviet representative on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since 1966.

Associated with the GKAE for 15 months longer than its Chairman, Andronik Petrosyants, Morokhov has a wide range of interests and responsibilities in atomic energy matters; he frequently serves as acting Chairman of the GKAE in Petrosyants' absence. His primary responsibility is that of drafting and executing agreements on peaceful uses of atomic energy with foreign governments, involving such topics as peaceful nuclear explosions, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the safeguarding of atomic information and materials. His role in Soviet nuclear programs is so pervasive that he is frequently called "Mr. Atomic Energy" by his colleagues in the USSR.

While genuinely interested in nonproliferation and in limiting nuclear weapons buildups, Morokhov is an ardent proponent of peaceful uses of atomic energy, including the use of atomic explosions for excavating new canal routes and creating storage cavities in deep salt deposits. Commentaries on nuclear issues believed to be written by Morokhov have appeared in the Soviet press under the alias I. Dmitriyev. Personal views and statements by Morokhov probably are an accurate barometer of the official Kremlin position on most nuclear issues; he faithfully adheres to the Moscow line when discussing atomic energy policies and undoubtedly plays an influential role himself in establishing those policies.

### Skillful Negotiator

Morokhov's most important accomplishment to date was heading the Soviet delegation during negotiations for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty/







Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (TTBT/PNE) Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, which was signed in May 1976, after 18 months of extensive negotiations in Moscow. He is currently in charge of the Soviet participation in negotiations being held in London and Vienna among the nuclear supplier nations—the so-called London Club—in an effort to achieve multilateral agreements on such issues as nonproliferation, physical protection, fuel reprocessing, regional fuel-cycle centers and international plutonium management. Morokhov has told US officials that he is, however, not relieved of his full-time GKAE duties while occupied with international negotiations; he does feel that these negotiations have been good training for him, and that he has learned a great deal about new technical and mathematical symbols and concepts.

A skillful negotiator, Morokhov maintains a tight reign over the other members of Soviet contingents, regardless of their rank or position. He usually ensures that the general tone of discussions with his foreign counterparts is friendly and constructive; he is frequently willing to comment on subjects not on the official agenda. Following the completion of the TTBT/PNE talks, he had high praise for the cordial working relationship that had evolved between the US and Soviet delegations. On numerous other occasions he has urged that regular Soviet-American consultations on atomic matters be established, asserting that "though we don't always act in concert, we always understand each other."

US observers have noted that Morokhov is always cognizant of the political undertones of such high-level technical negotiations. He stated at one point during the TTBT/PNE talks that the political aspect of the talks was more important than the technical one, and he insisted on limiting the publicity at the initialing of the draft treaty to leave more limelight for the formal treaty signing by the political leaders of both nations.

### Scientific Background

In addition to his skills as a negotiator, Morokhov has impressed US officials with his detailed knowledge of nuclear technology. His expertise in this field was apparently acquired through working experience rather than through formal training. With a general background in engineering, Morokhov began his career at the Moscow Aviation Institute, where he specialized in jet engines. When the Soviets first began their atomic energy program, talented individuals from many different fields and institutes were selected to staff the program; Morokhov was chosen in this way, probably during World War II. Little is known of his early activities in the atomic energy program, but he may have worked at classified facilities in Siberia and in the Urals prior to becoming GKAE Deputy Chairman in 1960. Now a doctor of technical sciences and a part-time professor (probably at the Institute of Atomic Energy *imeni* Kurchatov in Moscow), Morokhov specializes in such areas as reactor technology, isotope separation, controlled thermonuclear reactions, hydrodynamics and nuclear fuel processes.

**Personal Data**

Igor' Dmitriyevich Morokhov was born on 19 August 1919 in Ivanovo, RSFSR. In addition to his many trips to Vienna for IAEA meetings, he frequently heads Soviet atomic energy delegations to Western and Soviet bloc countries. His only visit to the United States was in July 1971 for the third session of US-USSR Technical Talks on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, held in Washington, D.C.

Presumably broadened by his travel and foreign contacts and by his IAEA post in Vienna, Morokhov has been described by many Western officials as the antithesis of the typical Moscow-based bureaucrat. He has a keen sense of humor and a quick wit, although he is usually serious and frank in technical discussions. He consumes more than the average amount of alcohol but does not appear to be affected by it. Morokhov apparently suffered a heart attack around 1960. He is a photography buff. He and his wife have two daughters and a son. Morokhov speaks some German and a little English, but he requires an interpreter for formal discussions.

CIA/DDI/OCR
DLodge

1 April 1977





## Viktor Nikolayevich POLYAKOV

(1975)

***Minister of the Automotive Industry***

Viktor Polyakov (pronounced puh-lyahKOFF) was appointed Minister of the Automotive Industry in July 1975, a month after the death of his predecessor, Aleksandr Tarasov. Polyakov, who had served as Deputy Minister of the Automotive Industry for the previous 10 years, was elevated to First Deputy just prior to Tarasov's death. He is perhaps best known for his role in planning, organizing and directing the Volga Motor Vehicle Plant in Tol'yatti, which began producing cars in 1970. In 1974 he became general director of the Volga Production Association, a collection of Soviet automotive enterprises that includes the Tol'yatti facility.

**Dependence on Western Technology**

Polyakov heads a Ministry that has relied heavily on Western technology during the last several years for the development of modern production facilities. As director of the Volga Plant, he supervised the introduction of Italian design and production concepts by the Fiat Company. Ministry officials also have negotiated with US companies for the purchase of technology and equipment for the huge Kama Motor Vehicle Plant at Naberezhnyye Chelny. The infusion of Western know-how has resulted in a dramatic increase in automobile production; there are plans to market a Soviet car, the Zhiguli, in the United States soon.

**Early Career**

Viktor Nikolayevich Polyakov was born in Tomsk in central Siberia on 3 March 1915. A trained engineer who came up through the ranks, he had become chief of the planning and research department at the Stalin Motor Vehicle Plant in Moscow by January 1954. During 1954-57 the Soviet press identified Polyakov as chief engineer of the Small Displacement Motor Vehicle Plant (MZMA), now known as the Moskvich Motor Vehicle Plant. Replacing V. P. Ivanov as director of the MZMA in 1960, Polyakov directed the production of Moskvich automobiles for 4 years.

In early 1964 Polyakov was temporarily diverted into administrative work with the Moscow Council of the National Economy (*sovnarkhoz*), one of a number of regional economic supervisory bodies set up by then Premier Nikita

Khrushchev. Assigned as first deputy chairman of the Moscow *Sovnarkhoz*, he advanced to chairman a year later—a post that must have conferred upon him a significant role in economic policy making for the area. The economic councils were abolished, however, in late 1965 by Khrushchev's successors, and Polyakov returned to full-time administrative work in the auto industry. By 1966 he had been named a Deputy Minister of the Auto Industry and given concurrent responsibilities as general director of the Volga Motor Vehicle Plant.

### Travel

Polyakov has traveled widely in the course of his duties. During the 1950's and 1960's he made at least four visits to the Fiat Automobile Plant in Turin, Italy. He traveled to the United States in April 1957 for a tour of automotive production facilities and an automobile exhibit in New York. Polyakov has also visited West European countries on several occasions.

### Publications and Awards

Polyakov has contributed several articles to Soviet technical journals on the characteristics and operating performance of the Moskvich automobile engine. He holds the title of Hero of Socialist Labor. He apparently does not speak English.

1 April 1977





## Yakov Petrovich RYABOV

*Secretary, CPSU Central Committee*

*(1976)*

Yakov Ryabov (pronounced RYAHbuff) was elected a Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee in October 1976, after having served since January 1971 as Party first secretary of Sverdlovsk Oblast, a key industrial area with one of the largest Party organizations in the Soviet Union. Ryabov's duties in the Secretariat apparently involve supervision of the defense industry. His election brings the number of Party Secretaries to 11, of whom Ryabov, born in 1928, is the youngest.

The election of Ryabov to the Secretariat makes him a man to watch. Not only is he now a member of the Party's top executive body, he also seems to be a protégé of Politburo member Andrey Kirilenko, who is regarded as a logical candidate to succeed Leonid Brezhnev as leader of the CPSU. Kirilenko himself had served in the Sverdlovsk Oblast Party post while a nonvoting member of the Party Presidium (now Politburo), and he still retains ties to the area.

Whatever Ryabov's connections with Kirilenko, he has earned a reputation as a capable leader in his own right: Ryabov has saved millions of rubles through the efficient management of Sverdlovsk's industrial enterprises. He is a prolific writer on key issues such as labor productivity, technical progress, central versus regional planning, production associations and the role of the Party organizations in the reconstruction of Soviet industry.

He has been a voting member of the CPSU Central Committee since April 1971.

### Industrial Initiatives and Economic Views

In recent years Ryabov has become known for his program of increasing industrial production by remodeling and enlarging existing plants with minimum investments. Kirilenko singled out this activity for praise in a March 1975 article in the journal *Kommunist* (published by the Central Committee) and noted that a Central Committee decree had approved Ryabov's initiative. In a 1976 *Pravda* interview, Ryabov himself boasted that his oblast had saved 600 million rubles in the last 5-year period by remodeling instead of building new plants.

Ryabov has written numerous articles in authoritative journals on economic matters. One theme that emerges from his recent writings is the greater effectiveness of Party intervention in local economic affairs as compared with governmental direction. In 1975, for example, he wrote an article in *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* on the remodeling of agricultural and industrial enterprises, in which specific Ministries were criticized. A year later, speaking before the 25th Party Congress, Ryabov implicitly criticized Gosplan and the central Ministries when he contrasted the effective work of the Party with the unsatisfactory work of the government in economic matters.

**Early Life and Career**

Yakov Petrovich Ryabov was born on 24 March 1928. He has spent his entire career in Sverdlovsk Oblast. In the late 1940's and early 1950's, he worked at the Sverdlovsk Turbine Engine Plant as a designer while studying in the evenings at the Ural Polytechnic Institute. He graduated from the institute in 1952 and continued work at the plant as an engineer, shop chief and, after 1957, Party committee secretary. In 1960 Ryabov became a Party secretary in Ordzhonikidze Rayon of Sverdlovsk Oblast, and from 1963 until 1966 he served as first secretary of the Sverdlovsk City Party Committee. During part of this time, Ryabov served under Andrey Kirilenko, who was Party first secretary of Sverdlovsk Oblast from 1955 until 1962. When Kirilenko departed for Moscow, Ryabov continued to make progress in his career under Konstantin Nikolayev, Kirilenko's successor. Nikolayev promoted a number of new approaches and programs in the economic field, and Ryabov apparently learned a great deal from him, serving directly under Nikolayev as oblast second secretary from 1966 until 1971.

During the late 1960's Ryabov wrote frequently of his oblast's experimental use of a program for the scientific organization of labor. In 1970 he reviewed another highly publicized experimental program associated with the Shchekino area, in which gradual reductions in the plant work force were used to finance incentive payments for the remaining workers to increase production. Ryabov was also active in promoting the creation of production associations, another widely publicized economic experiment. Thus, when he replaced Nikolayev as oblast first secretary on the latter's retirement in 1971, Sverdlovsk had long been engaging in innovative and advanced economic programs resembling those for which Leningrad, an area with stronger political influence, had gained a wide reputation. From 1971 until he was promoted to the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat in October 1976, Ryabov continued the innovative approach in Sverdlovsk, and the oblast earned a reputation rivaling that of Leningrad. In October 1976, after his election as a Party Secretary, he was awarded the Order of Lenin for his work in Sverdlovsk, particularly for his achievements in meeting the goals of the Ninth 5 Year Plan.



**Personal Data and Travel**

Ryabov is married. He has led or been a member of several CPSU delegations to foreign countries. In 1971 he accompanied Brezhnev to Czechoslovakia and traveled with Kirilenko to Mongolia. He accompanied Party Secretary Mikhail Suslov to France in 1972 and led a CPSU delegation to Belgium in 1973. In the latter year Ryabov vacationed with his wife in Italy. Ryabov apparently does not speak English.

1 April 1977

## CHRONOLOGY

Yakov Petrovich RYABOV

USSR

| | |
|---|---|
| 24 Mar 1928 | Born. |
| 1943 | Worked as lathe and milling machine operator. |
| 1946-58 | Worked at Sverdlovsk Turbine Engine Plant as an engineer and shop chief. |
| 1952 | Graduated from Ural Polytechnic Institute (evening division). |
| 1954 | Joined CPSU. |
| 1960 | Served as first secretary, Ordzhonikidze Rayon Party Committee. |
| 1963 | Elected first secretary, Sverdlovsk City Party Committee. |
| 1966 | Elected second secretary, Sverdlovsk Oblast Party Committee. |
| 1971 | Elected first secretary, Sverdlovsk Oblast Party Committee. |
| Apr 1971 | Elected voting member, CPSU Central Committee. |
| 26 Oct 1976 | Elected Secretary, CPSU Central Committee. |



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**USSR** **Eduard Amvrosiyevich SHEVARDNADZE**

(1976)

***First Secretary, Central Committee, Communist Party of Georgia***

One of the youngest regional Party leaders in the Soviet Union, Eduard Shevardnadze (pronounced shevard-NAHDzeh) became first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party in September 1972, at the age of 43. He was a newcomer to the Georgian Party hierarchy, having served in the government for the previous 7 years as republic minister of internal affairs, charged with the preservation of law and order. The chief factor in Shevardnadze's promotion was his experience as a police administrator.

In the Soviet Union, Georgia has long been known as an enclave of high living and fast rackets. Its most important economic activity, wine production, is one of the oldest and the best loved branches of Georgian agriculture. Georgians are freedom loving and individualistic; they have always lived by looser rules than other Soviet nationalities, first because former Premier Iosif Stalin (himself a Georgian by birth) indulged them, and later, apparently, because the pattern had been established.

**Disciplinarian in a Loose Republic**

Former police official Shevardnadze, who has nurtured an image as a firm, austere disciplinarian (the Georgians refer to him as the "boss"), has tried since 1972 to overturn the habits of generations regarding easy virtue, political corruption, underground capitalism and heavy drinking. The Georgians are not giving in easily. Shevardnadze's cleanup campaign met with early and continued foot dragging, and during his first year as Georgian Party leader he encountered considerable bureaucratic opposition. Speakers at an August 1973 Party Plenum hinted at disorders among the public at large, and rumors of anonymous threats against Shevardnadze and his family were prevalent throughout 1973.

Several recent developments indicate that Shevardnadze's cleanup campaign in Georgia has been intense, broad and continuous. An underground Soviet publication that appeared in 1975 claimed that nearly 25,000 persons had been arrested in Georgia in the past 2 years. (A Soviet who visited Georgia in late 1974 reported that 13,000 Party and Komsomol

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Automatically declassified on Date impossible to Determine

members had been arrested.) In addition, the republic's second secretary, Al'bert Churkin, was dismissed in April 1975 for gross errors and shortcomings.

During 197[illegible]ere was a series of bomb and arson attacks in the republic as Shevardnadze continued his all-out campaign against corruption, nationalism and ideological deviation in Georgia. The attacks may have been intended to blacken Shevardnadze's reputation by showing his inability to control the Georgian situation; there were rumors that the first secretary was on the way out because of the disorders. A lor g, hard-hitting report delivered by Shevardnadze in July 1976 seemed to indicate that despite the disturbances he was still in control. His repeated allusions to approval of his campaign by the central authorities in Moscow, however, betrayed a certain unease about his authority in the republic.

### Views on Agriculture

In 1975, when Georgia was suffering from the Soviet Union's general harvest failure, Shevardnadze set forth several new ideas on agriculture. In a report delivered to a local Party meeting, he attacked the existing program for construction of large mechanized livestock facilities—a pet project of top Soviet agricultural officials—and proposed instead to divert a part of the material and money to help expand the feed base. Shevardnadze also made several proposals designed to strengthen the position of individual farmers. For example, he asked that the feed allotment be ensured for livestock owned by individuals; that unwanted land (swamp lands or rocky areas) be turned over to the population, with technical assistance and fertilizer provided by the state; and that individual farmers form cooperative associations. Little has been heard of these proposals since 1975, but they are indicative of Shevardnadze's surprisingly pragmatic leadership style, which may serve him well in the face of continuing political problems in his republic.

### Early Life and Career

A native Georgian, Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze was born on 25 January 1928. He was the son of a teacher and was educated as a historian at a pedagogical institute, but he began his career as a Komsomol functionary in 1946. He rose through the ranks to become first secretary of the Georgian Komsomol Central Committee in December 1957. Shevardnadze was elected a nonvoting member of the Bureau of the Georgian Party Central Committee, his first Party post, in 1958, and 3 years later he advanced from nonvoting to voting membership on the Bureau of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee.

### Political Eclipse and Recovery

In 1961 Shevardnadze was released without explanation as Komsomol chief and removed from his position on the Party Bureau. His career in eclipse, he served for 3 years in minor Party posts in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital. He began his political comeback in 1965, when he was appointed





Georgian minister for the protection of public order, a title later changed to minister of internal affairs. His career may have benefited at this stage from an association with Aleksandr Shelepin, at that time a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Politburo: When Shevardnadze became Georgian Komsomol chief, Shelepin was first secretary of the All-Union Komsomol, and when he was named minister, Shelepin's influence in Moscow was at its peak.

In July 1972 Shevardnadze was elected a voting member of the republic's Party Bureau and first secretary of the Tbilisi City Party Committee. Shevardnadze did not serve as first secretary for long—2 months later he became Georgian Party chief. He has been a Deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet since 1974.

### Travel

While he was Komsomol first secretary, Shevardnadze made several trips abroad to attend youth conferences, visiting Belgium, Tunisia and France. Since becoming republic first secretary, he has increased his contacts with foreign officials through travel and attendance at official functions. During 1974 he headed a CPSU delegation to the Austrian Communist Party Congress, attended a dinner in Moscow given by CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev for the President of France, met with Senator Edward Kennedy in Georgia, and traveled with Politburo member Nikolay Podgornyy to Sofia. He accompanied Brezhnev to the Hungarian Party Congress in March 1975.

Shevardnadze has a brother, Ippokrat, who has been active in the Georgian Party apparatus. No further personal information on Shevardnadze is currently available.

CIA/DDI/OCR
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1 April 1977

**USSR** **Nikolay Ivanovich SMIRNOV**

***First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Navy***



(1971)

Fleet Admiral Nikolay Smirnov (pronounced smirNOFF) was identified as First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy in October 1974. As the navy's second in command, Smirnov supervises day-to-day functions and makes most of the operational decisions. From 1969 to 1974 Smirnov, a submariner, had served as Pacific Fleet commander, overseeing the USSR's largest naval surface force and second largest submarine fleet. He is regarded by many Western observers as the most likely officer to succeed Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Sergey Gorshkov when he retires.

**Early Life and Career**

Born on 10 September 1917 into a Russian peasant family, Smirnov joined the Navy in 1937. He graduated from the Higher Naval School *imeni* Frunze (the Soviet Naval Academy) in 1939 and assumed line duties, which included submarine command in the Pacific Fleet during World War II. He joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1942. His immediate postwar whereabouts are not clear. He may be identical to the captain 2nd rank (equal to a US naval commander) of the same name who was attached to the Soviet Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol in July 1947. Smirnov's Soviet biographies indicate that after the war he held command positions in the Black and Baltic Fleets and that from 1945 to 1957 he rose from commander of a submarine to chief of staff of a unit of submarines. A 1966 Estonian newspaper article mentioned him as a former member of the Military Council of the "Baltic Front" involved in the wartime defense of the capital city of Tallinn.

Smirnov attended the General Staff Academy (a joint services war college with a 2-year course at flag and general officer level) in Moscow, probably sometime in the 1950's. He was assigned to the Black Sea Fleet as its chief of staff around 1960, he was a rear admiral with that fleet in December 1961 when he signed the obituary of an officer formerly with that command. Smirnov remained with the Black Sea Fleet until 1964 when, as a vice admiral, he was transferred to the Main Naval Staff in Moscow, probably as







Deputy Chief for Operations. He remained in Moscow on the Main Naval Staff until May 1969, when he was first identified in the Soviet press as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet based in Khabarovsk. Smirnov was promoted to admiral in 1970 and to fleet admiral in November 1973. He remained with the Pacific Fleet until 1974, when he was appointed First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy.

**A Political Admiral**

Smirnov's infrequent writings and public statements tend toward the general, the historical and the propagandistic rather than toward specific naval tactics and strategy. He was elected a Deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet at its eighth convocation in 1970 and a nonvoting member of the CPSU Central Committee at the 24th Party Congress in 1971, when he commanded the Pacific Fleet. Smirnov was not reelected to membership on the Central Committee at the next Party congress in 1976, when he was the First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Navy. (Incumbents in that position are usually not elected to Central Committee membership, while fleet commanders usually are.)

**Travel**

Except for his sea duty, Smirnov has traveled infrequently outside the Soviet Union. He visited Yugoslavia as part of a Soviet Navy delegation in 1967 and accompanied then Defense Minister Andrey Grechko to Pakistan and India in March 1969. Smirnov visited Sri Lanka during April-May 1972 on a goodwill mission.

**Personal Data**

According to US military attachés in Moscow, Smirnov has a degree of initiative that distinguishes him from most Soviet commanders. In 1965, when he was with the Main Naval Staff, he impressed foreign military attachés as being friendly, intelligent and confident. One Soviet admiral at that time described him as a bright young man. US attachés who conversed with him on several occasions in 1976 found him to be idealistic about Soviet socialism but open and pleasant, although initially rather quiet and aloof. He appears to like and respect Americans. Smirnov is big and robust. He is married and has a daughter. He does not speak English.

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**USSR** **Semen Kuz'mich TSVIGUN**

***First Deputy Chairman,***
***Committee for State Security***

(1974)

A career intelligence officer, Col. Gen. Semen Tsvigun (pronounced TSVEEgoon) has been First Deputy Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB) since 1967. As the senior deputy to KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov, he is second in command of the organization that is responsible for both internal security (including the secret police) and most of the country's foreign intelligence activities. Since 1971 Tsvigun has been a nonvoting member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) — status attained by few of his predecessors.

**Successor to Andropov?**

Tsvigun is regarded by many observers as the most obvious candidate to succeed Andropov as KGB Chairman. An apparent "Brezhnev man" (he has career and possibly family ties to CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev), Tsvigun has served as acting Chairman in Andropov's absence and has been unusually visible for a KGB officer, participating in public ceremonies and even trying his hand as a novelist. Tsvigun's promotion, however, would be a break from recent precedent: The last Chairman to be chosen from within the KGB ranks was Lavrentiy Beriya, whose political ambitions led to his execution in 1953. Tsvigun's apparent ties with Brezhnev, moreover, could weigh against his selection if the collective leadership is intent on keeping the top KGB post in politically neutral hands.

**Novelist and Watchdog**

The most prolific author among the senior KGB officers, Tsvigun has but one basic theme—vigilance against internal and external subversion. While his fellow officers also stress the vigilance theme, he seems to do so more persistently and crudely than most. In recent years Tsvigun has been a contributor to such Party journals as *Politicheskoye Samoobrazovaniye* (Political Self-Education), *Agitator* and *Kommunist*. He is the author of two books: *My Vernemsya* (We Shall Return), 1971, a semi-autobiographical novel about partisan warfare in the Ukraine; and *Taynyy Front* (Secret Front), 1973, an account of Western intelligence operations directed against

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the Soviet Union. In 1971 a Moscow dissident, who described Andropov as a "liberal" by KGB standards, said of Tsvigun: "Andropov's deputy is another matter . . . . His succession would mean a much more strict atmosphere."

**Early Life and Career**

A native Ukrainian, Semen Kuz'mich Tsvigun was born on 27 September 1916. After graduating from the Odessa Pedagogical Institute in 1937, he worked briefly as an instructor and director of a secondary school in Odessa Oblast before entering intelligence work in 1939. Tsvigun joined the CPSU in 1940. Except for his service in the Soviet Army (1941-45), nothing is known of his activities during the following decade.

Between 1951 and 1967 Tsvigun held high-level intelligence positions in three Soviet republics. He was a deputy chief of intelligence in Moldavia (bordering Romania) from 1951 to 1955, serving for the first year under Brezhnev, who was the republic's first secretary at that time. Tsvigun later gained membership in the Moldavian Party Bureau during Brezhnev's early years in the CPSU Secretariat in Moscow, when Brezhnev's patronage in Moldavia remained strong. In 1955 Tsvigun moved to Tadzhikistan (bordering Afghanistan and China) as deputy chairman of the republic KGB, and 2 years later he became chairman. In 1963 Tsvigun was named KGB chairman in the Azerbaydzhan Republic on the Iranian border, a position he held until June 1967, when he moved to Moscow to become a deputy to Andropov. By November 1967 Tsvigun had advanced to First Deputy Chairman.

**Honors and Awards**

Tsvigun has been a Deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet since 1966. He holds two awards: a Medal for Labor Distinction, given in 1957 when he was KGB deputy chairman in Tadzhikistan; and a Certificate of Honor, awarded in 1966 on his 50th birthday.

**Family Data**

According to unconfirmed reports, Tsvigun is an in-law of Brezhnev's wife. He and his wife, Roza Mikhaylovna, have at least two children: a daughter, Vela, and a married son, Mikhail. The son, born around 1944, is a 1968 graduate of the International Relations Faculty of Moscow State University and served as an attaché and interpreter at the Embassy in Beirut from 1968 to 1972.

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1 April 1977

**USSR**

## Kirill Stepanovich SIMONOV

***Chief, Transport and Communications Department, CPSU Central Committee***

*(1960)*

Kirill Simonov (pronounced sim-OHNuf) took over the Transport and Communications Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee in June 1962, after a career of over 20 years in Soviet railroads. An engineer and station master in the early 1940's, he rose to prominence among Soviet railroad researchers and administrators by 1960. In his present position Simonov serves as the channel of Party policy for Soviet maritime, rail, river and road transportation and for communications systems such as radio, telephone and television. A member of the CPSU since 1943, he has been a member of its Central Auditing Commission since 1966.

### Early Career on the Railroad

Kirill Stepanovich Simonov was born on 17 April 1917 in Petrograd (now Leningrad). There are reports that he was a political officer in 1939 during the Russo-Finnish War, but it seems more likely that he was then a student at the Leningrad Railroad Institute, from which he graduated in 1940. During the latter year, he went to work for the October Railroad in the same city, learning his trade under conditions of wartime bombardment and blockade. By 1947 Simonov had become chief of a division of the railroad. Shortly thereafter he transferred to an administrative position in the Ministry of Railways. Selected for further training in 1949, he completed the Academy of Railroad Transport in Moscow in 1951, earning a candidate of technical sciences degree and the title of associate professor. Simonov returned to the Ministry of Railways in 1951. A year later he was named a division chief in the Ministry's Central Scientific Research Institute. In 1955 he became chief engineer of the Main Administration of Railroad Traffic.

### Expanded Influence

In 1957 Simonov's career in the railroad ministry took an upward turn. He was appointed deputy chairman, and later that year first deputy chairman, of the Ministry's Scientific and Technical Council. At the same time he began to make official visits abroad. On one of those visits a colleague declared that Simonov's position was more influential than his title indicated

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and described him as the "number-three man" in the Ministry of Railways, with responsibility for all higher educational institutions specializing in the training of railroad engineers, for the Ministry's Scientific Research Institute and for hundreds of railroad research and experimental laboratories. Simonov's publications during that period also indicated a broader range of interests: He wrote articles on the British and Swedish railroad systems in 1958 and 1960 and contributed to a major work on rail traffic organizational problems in 1961.

### Into Party Work

Unaccountably, Simonov was released from his ministerial duties in 1961 and assigned as chief of the Gor'kiy Railroad, a post with heavy responsibilities but without the career advantages of his former position in Moscow. Advancement came through a new channel the following year, when Simonov was transferred back to the capital and into the CPSU Central Committee apparatus as deputy chief of the Transport and Communications Department; shortly thereafter he became chief of the department. Simonov's sudden ascendance is an impressive feat in itself; he had never headed a ministry, or even served as a deputy minister. Yet only a year after taking over a provincial railway network, he became the Party's overseer for the entire Soviet transportation and communications system, including the Ministries of Railways, the Automotive Industry, the Maritime Fleet, and Communications, as well as the RSFSR Ministry of the River Fleet. Such success can often be accounted for by personal ties with one or more members of the top leadership group but, in the case of Simonov, no such ties can be discerned.

### Travel and Ancillary Posts

Simonov visited the United States as a member of a Soviet railroad exchange delegation in November-December 1960 and traveled to Canada in 1967. During the early 1970's Simonov went to Mongolia to study Party work (1971) and headed a CPSU delegation to Hungary (1972). Most recently, he accompanied Belorussian Party First Secretary Petr Masherov to Paris for a meeting of the European Conference on Solidarity with Chilean Democrats (1974).

A deputy to the RSFSR (Russian Republic) Supreme Soviet, the region's rubber-stamp parliament, since 1967, Simonov served as a member of its Transport and Communications Commission between 1971 and 1975.

### A Dynamic Bureaucrat

Western observers have met Simonov only rarely. One of his hosts during his 1960 US trip described him as a well-informed, capable administrator with tremendous drive. Simonov at that time was pleasant in conversation, although reticent about himself. He spoke some English, was enthusiastic and excitable, and had a tendency to raise his voice at times. One US official who

conversed with Simonov in German speculated that his facility in that language may have resulted from an extended stay in Germany.

Simonov and his wife, a teacher of German and English in 1960, have a daughter, born around 1944.

CIA/DDI/OCR
PVanNeste

1 April 1977







Subject: Presidential Visit to Iran and Mid East Talks

Participants: Guennadi Kazankin, Soviet First Secretary
John D. Stempel, AmEmbassy Tehran

Time & Place: Brothers Chelo Kabab on Amiradabak, January 9, 1978

Distribution: AMB/DCM OR NEA/IRN
POL BIO INR/RNA
POL/MIL DAO INR/OIL/B

President Carter's Iran Visit: This was the first time I had seen Kazankin since our New Year Eve day brunch. He was pleasant and interested in the Presidential visit. He began by asking what we had hoped to gain and what the results were. I laughingly asked him to give me his whole list of questions because I could answer them better that way. He appeared somewhat flustered and said he had no other questions. I then told him the President's visit was an unqualified success and that the President's entire trip seemed to be a major accomplishment for the Administration, especially the visit to Poland.

Middle East Peace Efforts: Curiously, Kazankin did not ask about the talks between President Carter and King Hussein. He started to probe extensively about the Aswan meeting and in a moment of puckishness I asked him about the rumor (non-existent) that Libyan Leader Quadhafi would fly to Aswan. Kazankin indicated he knew nothing about this but seemed puzzled. At his every subsequent attempt to raise the American role in the current Middle East peace talks, I reiterated my question as to what Qadhafi's role was going to be, even suggesting that President Asad of Syria might fly in privately to join the "Summit." After we had been through this line for the third time, he began to believe the story--at least enough to question somebody about it.

Bio Data: Over the course of discussion Kazankin indicated he would be leaving Iran in May or June of 1979. When asked where he would be posted, he said he did not want to go anywhere else in the world but home. He hopes to receive a posting to "The Foreign Affairs Institue" so that he can

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complete his work for a "full" doctorate. He indicated t
he was only a candidate and that a full doctorate require
publication of a book with original ideas and the teachin
of "what you might call disciples." We sparred deftly as
whether this was equal to, or higher than, a U.S. doctora
Conclusion: different. He indicated his wife, Yelena, h
to return to the Soviet Union as well. She intended to
resume her career as a journalist; he indicated she had
written for many publications, including the English langua
version of Soviet Life (or Soviet Women).

When I extended my ritual invitation to eat at the Ameri
Embassy Caravansari restaurant, he accepted (for the firs
time), so we agreed that he would come to the Embassy for
lunch Febraury 5, whereupon I would join him for a sauna
the Soviet Trade Commission (the politics of sweat?).





MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Guennady Kazankin, Soviet Embassy
John D. Stempel, American Embassy

DATE & PLACE: February 5, 1978, Caravansarai Restaurant and Russian Trade Commission, Tehran, Iran

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, ECON, OR ~~BIO~~, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA INR/OIL/B

SUBJECT : Russian Views on Mid-East, Horn of Africa and Recent Distrubances in Qom--and the New Russian Sauna

Kazankin and I had lunch at the American Embassy Caravansarai Restaurant and then adjourned to the Russian Trade Commission to sample the new sauna which was installed last fall. The Russians are extremely proud of their new sauna which has Finnish sandalwood on the interior and solid wood panelling from Russia in the outer ante-rooms and dressing rooms. Kazankin said the Russian trade commissioner had built the sauna and had already invited the Finnish Ambassador and East German Ambassador to sample its wares. The sauna itself is complete but the small swimming pool just outside the door has not yet been finished. Kazankin had been trying for over two months to arrange an invitation to the sauna but I had refused to go until he agreed to accept my earlier invitation to lunch at my Embassy restaurant.

In addition to general boilerplate on Soviet-American relations, Kazankin touched on three items of interest:

Ethiopia-Somali Conflict:
We discussed the Horn at some length with me criticizing the Soviet airlift and Kazankin denying it took place. Kazankin twice asked whether I thought Iran would assist the Somalis. I indicated I did not know but suspected that it depended on whether the Soviets continued to aid the Ethiopians or not. He said the Soviet Union was merely helping Ethiopia defend its borders and would help Somalia defend its borders equally if the Ethiopians crossed the Somali frontier. I expressed disbelief of this and suggested the better way to solve the problem would be to back the OAU initiatives.

The Mid-East Situation:
Kazankin took a fairly firm line in this discussion referring always to the Soviet position that Mid-East peace would only come through negotiations by all at Geneva. I probed whether the Soviets would be willing to discuss

the results of the Sadat-Begin talks at Geneva and he said anything could be discussed but it was important to return to Geneva. This was a much harder position than he had taken a month earlier.

Qom Disturbances:
The only subject related to internal Iranian politics that Kazankin seemed interested in was the Qom disturbances of January 7-9. He asked what I thought of these, and I indicated that the whole affair seemed to be a bit of police overreaction. In response to my question, who he thought was behind the disturbances, he said it appeared to be the work of religious fanatics. He would not or could not be drawn out more, and from his comments I gathered that the Soviets don't know much about the inner workings of the Qom situation. He asked me several times what sort of people I thought were involved and I limited myself to saying that these seem to be religious leaders, but I noted that we knew little about their doctorines.

Kazankin said the Soviet Embassy has been getting some circulars from "the Union of National Front Forces". In response to questions, he described the circulars and they seem to be the same ones the Embassy had acquired. I noted I had vaguely heard mention of this group and suggested he was lucky to receive these things in the mail. He chuckled.

Bio Notes:
Over the course of two hours dipping in and out of the sauna, Kazankin passed on the following information about himself and other Soviet mission personnel. Kazankin himself was a basketball player but has not played much since an injury took him off the Foreign Ministry Institute team in 1957. As a result of a severely sprained ankle, he met his wife, Yelena, whom he dated for three years prior to their marriage in 1960. He described their courtship with the English phrase "going steady", and it appeared that they had gotten through the preliminaries fairly rapidly. Kazankin indicated again that he hoped to return to Moscow and complete work on his formal doctorate at the Ministry's Foreign Institute. He has no desire to serve abroad again and actively dislikes his present foreign assignment. He carefully refrained from commenting on his marriage. Though there were several opportunities, I did not press the question.

Though the Soviet Trade Commission arranged for the construction of the sauna, the Soviet Ambassador does not particularly care for it. Kazankin said the sauna was built by Embassy personnel in their spare time. (Hah! We should have such talented "volunteer" help.) The Trade Commission compound has several volleyball courts and an old, unused tennis court and much green space. It is located





last North of the bazaar on a small Kuche called Pourmedari in the compound which used to house the Soviet Embassy until the new chancery was built in 1965

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: John D. Stempel, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy
Gunneday Kazankan, Soviet Embassy, Tehran

DATE & PLACE: March 19, 1978, Brothers' Chelo Kebab, Amir Atabak Street

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, POL/M, ÒR, VOIO, AMCONSUL ISFAHAN, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA, INR/OIL/B, ECON

This lunch was the first time I had seen Kazankan since our meeting on February 5. He had called up to postpone the lunch once pleading a cold. Aside from some general chit chat, the following were the only items of interest and importance.

U.S. Nuclear Plants in Iran: Kazankan was very curious about the status of the agreement to sell U.S. nuclear plants to Iran. He said he had heard the agreement was to be signed at the end of March and pressed for details. I legitimately pleaded virtually total ignorance of details but noted with the passage of the U.S. nuclear non-proliferation act, the way was clear for dotting i's and crossing t's.

Tehran Rumors: Kazankan and I exchanged stories about the rumors concerning the attacks against Iranians and foreigners which have been rampant during the past 2-3 weeks. I needled Kazankan about the stories reported to me that TASS men were spreading the rumor that three Americans had been raped. He became very defensive and suggested that the Chinese had been spreading these rumors. I allowed that might be possible but repeated to him that I had heard these stories about TASS men from several different people. I encouraged him to check it out and tell them to knock it off. Whenever I would raise an awkward question, he would quickly jump in with the line that the Chinese must be spreading the rumors.

Horn of Africa: We touched only lightly on the matters at the Horn. I gave him the basic U.S. position that "the Soviet-Cuban armies" should remain on the Ethiopian side of the border. Speaking as if he were satisfied that matters were going his way, he suggested that the Chinese had been spreading stories of Russian involvement.

The Amouzegar Government: Kazankan asked me what I thought of the Amouzegar government. I asked him what he thought and why he was interested. He indicated that the Embassy was doing its

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spring review of Iranian domestic developments, and we agreed it was basically too early to tell. I had expected some jibe about Amouzegar being American trained, but it was not forthcoming.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS : Viktor Kazakov, Soviet Embassy, Tehran
Ralph Boyce, U.S. Embassy, Tehran

DATE AND PLACE : April 3, 1978, Chetnik's, Kheradmand St.

DISTRIBUTION : AMB/DCM, POL, POL/MIL, ECON, OR, BIO, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA, INR/OIL/B

Background : Kazakov is a young, hard-charging KGB officer who has been in Iran for two or three years. He is thirty years old, with a wife (who taught German in the Soviet Union) and a three-year old son. He has been in the Soviet Foreign Service since 1965, when, at the age of eighteen, he entered the Institute of International Affairs in Moscow. He was previously stationed in Kabul.

We met at the March consular officers' luncheon. At the time, he suggested getting together during New Rouz. A week or so later, he called me at home (at 11:30 pm!) to set up a luncheon appointment. We settled on March 27 at Chetnik's; but at the appointed hour, he failed to appear. Two days later he called me at home (from a streetside phone booth) to apologize. It seemed the phones in the Soviet Embassy were out of order, so he had been unable to tell me he couldn't make it. He apologized profusely and we agreed to meet at the same time, same place, on April 3.

To further display his chagrin over the earlier mix-up, Viktor brought me a gift-wrapped bottle of Stolichnaya Vodka. Contrary to his reputation for aggressiveness, he was rather meek, allowing me to steer most of the discussion towards subjects of my choice.

Dissidence in Iran : After a brief comparison of our respective Foreign Services and a discussion of Moscow vs. Washington as hardship posts for each other's diplomats, we began talking about dissidence in Iran. I asked him for his analysis of recent anti-regime activities, and he gave me a textbook explanation of oppressed masses rising up to overthrow their shackles, etc. I responded by saying Iran didn't seem to be as repressive a society as he made it out to be, citing examples of Iranian friends sitting in my living room, viciously criticizing the Shah. If fear of SAVAK were as all-pervasive as Viktor insinuated, why would they speak so freely in the home of a foreign diplomat?

Soviet Diplomats in Iran : This led us into a discussion of the problems encountered by Soviet diplomats in Iran. Viktor complained

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about restrictions on in-country travel, lack of administrative support from the Iranians (for example, the telephones never working at the Soviet mission), surveillance by SAVAK, etc. He seemed surprised to hear that U.S. diplomats are not required to inform the Foreign Ministry of their movements inside Iran.

I asked him how he liked doing consular work. He said he enjoys it because "I prefer people to paper."

Iranian - East German Relations : We talked about the withdrawal of the Iranian Ambassador from East Germany. Viktor said the Iranian "hooligans" had been sent to East Berlin by the West Germans as a means for disrupting closer ties between East Germany and Iran. He condemned this as being alien to the spirit of detente. I asked him if he thought East German spies in the upper echelons of the West German government were alien to the spirit of detente. He dismissed the spy scandals as devices for the West German government to distract its people's attention from more serious internal problems such as inflation and unemployment. Besides, he said, if a government official wants to make a little extra money by passing documents, "that's his personal business."

Viktor picked up the tab and we parted, agreeing to meet again at the April 10 consular officers' luncheon.

SA : RLBoyce : 4-4-78

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Guenneday Kazankan, USSR Embassy, Tehran, Iran
John D. Stempel, American Embassy, Tehran, Iran

Date & Place: May 16, 1978 - Brothers Chelokebab Restaurant

Subject : Afghanistan Coup and Disturbances in Iran

Distribution: AMB/DCM, POL, OR, BIO, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA, INR/OIL/B

Our "monthly luncheon" was somewhat rushed today, but Kazankan was in a very relaxed and not very intensive mood. His only major question referred to recent unrest in Iran. I gave him fairly pallid stuff noting the religious influence and the possibility assistance, perhaps even Soviet-trained personnel being volved. Kazankan said Soviets were keeping strictly hands off and were being watched very closely. When I referred to the reported deportment of Soviet diplomatic personnel, he became very defensive and insisted that these were all normal transfers. He steadfastly refused to get involved with names.

Afghanistan - When I asked him what had happened in Afghanistan since the present rulers seemed to be known by the Soviets, he allowed as how "they are good guys", but said they are certainly not in Soviet control (Comment: hah!). Kazankan countered by noting that new Afghan President Taraki had worked for the American Embassy and even went so far as to suggest he was "your man". We both laughed at this absurdity. Kazankan (who served in Afghanistan '65-'67) said he thought the Afghans were going to be pretty nationalistic although he obviously hoped Soviet-Afghan relations would be better. It was clear by his whole demeanor including his satisfied grin that recent Afghan events were not exactly displeasing to the Kremlin.

Soviet Embassy Personnel - Kazankan did not know if Soviet Embassy Officer Kapishin had left but did identify a Mr. Plakhti as a Soviet political counselor. Kazankan said in passing there are three Soviet political counselors and became so vague on identifying them that I couldn't resist a jibe as to whether Plakhti was the new KGB staff man. Kazankan professed to be mystified by this terminology, and when I said specifically, the leader of the KGB, he fluffed up and became funny.

Kazankan suggested we get together again before he left on summer vacation but did not press the matter. We discussed the possibility for another sauna including wives this time but made no firm commitment.

POL:JDStempel:lab:5-22-78

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Guennady Kazankin, Soviet Embassy, Tehran
John D. Stempel, American Embassy, Tehran

DATE & PLACE: July 18, 1978 - Chinese Restaurant, Pahlavi Ave.

SUBJECT : Human Rights, Afghanistan and Internal Iranian Politics

DISTRIBUTION: CHARGE, POL, OR, USIS, BIO, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA INR/OIL/B, AMEMBASSY KABUL

The tenor of the lunch was set when Stempel invited Kazankin to bring Shcharansky along as an extra guest. Kazankin asked who Shcharansky was and Stempel said he would be delighted to tell him over lunch. The following points of interest came out during the meeting.

Human Rights - Stempel immediately launched into a moderately restrained attack on Soviet policy with respect to dissidents. Why was the Soviet Union being so deliberately abrasive? Did Kazankin realize how silly and counterproductive the recent Soviet trials had been? Kazankin attempted to brunt the thrust with a fairly hard-line response that this was the Soviet way and very quickly shifted to Ambassador Young's statement of political prisoners in the U.S. After a considerable amount of back and forth discussion, talk about human rights more or less dissolved. Kazankin showed himself extremely adroit at bringing Young's comments to bear against American criticism of Soviet dissident activity.

Afghanistan - Kazankin, who had served in Afghanistan in the late 60s said the Soviets were adopting a wait-and-see attitude toward the new regime. When Stempel dryly asked whether placing various Soviet advisors in the ministries down to the privvy cleaner level was a wait-and-see attitude, Kazankin said these were all technical specialists and were not advisors. Stempel challenged him on this and asked for his comment on the nearly two dozen economic agreements the Soviets had signed with the new Afghanistan government. Kazankin said the Soviets were giving help to Afghanistan because they felt the government was doing more for the people than previous governments. He said Soviet relations with the two previous Afghan regimes had also been excellent to good. Stempel noted that there remained a good deal of suspicion in many quarters of Soviet activities in Afghanistan. Kazankin pressed for Iran's views of the problem. Stempel merely noted that the Iranians were suspicious. Kazankin described the new Afghanistan's government's program as "a good democratic bourgeoisie" program and resisted with only minor uneasiness Stempel's jabs at communist influence in Afghanistan.

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

Internal Iranian Politics - Kazankin pressed at several points for Stempel's views on the Iranian Internal Political scene. Stempel, pleading a recent return from vacation, merely said he had heard the political system was opening up. Kazankin poo pooed this and said, "If the Shah is still around next year, everything will be rigged by the government." Stempel picked up on the "if" and asked if Kazankin had any news that would suggest differently. Were the Soviets planning something in Iran? Kazankin cleared his throat and treated Stempel to the rumor that the Shah was reportedly sick from cancer or some other blood disease. (This rumor has abounded in many quarters and may be of Soviet inspiration.)

Kazankin also said he had heard the U.S. was trying to make Dr. Ali Amini prime minister again. Stempel denied this with a derisive snort and said the U.S. was delighted to see the political system opening up but the U.S. had no preferred candidates.

Visitors - In what has become a ritual, Stempel and Kazankin discussed perspective visitors from their countries to Iran. Kazankin noted that the head of the Soviet chamber of commerce had been in Iran in mid-July and Iran and the USSR had agreed to open a Soviet-Iran joint chamber. Kazankin did not seem very interested in Under Secretary Newsom's visit and Dr. Eugene Rostow's short stay here. (Comment: Perhaps the Soviet intelligence list has not caught up with recent events. On the other hand, maybe they feel they know all they need to know about the visit. Kazankin's lack of interest in these two visits was unusual.)

Bio Note - Kazankin will be leaving for Russia for vacation August 2. He invited the Stempel family for a Thursday afternoon swim lunch on July 27. (Comment: OR notes this is an unusual step; few official Americans are ever invited to Zargandeh, the Soviet summer compound.) Kazankin also expressed interest in seeing journal articles from American publications such as Foreign Policy, which dealt with Iran and the Mideast. Stempel promised to provide a few.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# TELEGRAM

1978 SEP -7 PM 12 46

Page 2 of 3

INDICATE COLLECT OR CHARGE TO

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| AMEMBASSY TEHRAN | CONFIDENTIAL |

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
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ACTION:

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC
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INFO: USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 08547 !
E.O. 11652: XGDS-4
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, IR, CH, PINT,
SUBJECT: SOVIET EMBASSY COMMENTS ON HUA VISIT TO IRAN

POL-3
AMB
DCM
CON-2
ECON
POL
DAO
SAVAK
GENTAB
USIA/

SUMMARY: SOVIETS APPEAR MIDLY CONCERNED ABOUT HUA VISIT AND ARE PROBING FOR POSSIBLE UNANNOUNCED MILITARY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN IRAN AND CHINA. END SUMMARY.

1. ACTING CHIEF OF POL SECTION WAS SEATED ACROSS FROM SOVIET POLITICAL OFFICER VLADIMIR GOLOVANOV (A KNOWN KGB OFFICER) AT DINNER EVENING SEPT 6 AT HOME OF FINNISH CHARGE. AFTER USUAL BANTER ABOUT RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES' INVOLVEMENT IN RECENT UNREST, GOLOVANOV PRESSED FOR U.S. VIEWS ON RECENT HUA VISIT AUG. 29-SEPT 1. EMBOFF REPLIED IT WAS SIMPLY MUTUAL GETTING TOGETHER OF TWO COUNTIRES CONCERNED WITH IRAN OTHERS' ACTIVITIES IN THE REGION. / SAW POSITIVE RELATIONS WITH CHINA AS COUNTER WEIGHT TO POSSIBLE SOVIET PRESSURE AND POTENTIAL INVOLVEMENT WITH DISSIDENCE WITHIN IRAN. GOLOVANOV

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| POL:JDStempel:lab | 9-7-78 | | DCM:CWNaas |

CLEARANCES:
POL:(subs)

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

00152-101

OPTIONAL FORM 152(H)
(Formerly FS-413(H))
January 1975
Dept. of State

AGREED VISIT WENT WELL AND SUGGESTED THIS TIE WITH CHINA MIGHT ALSO SERVE AS USEFUL COUNTER WEIGHT TO U.S. INFLUENCE. GOLOVANOV THEN ASKED WHETHER EMBOFF THOUGHT THERE HAD BEEN SECRET MILITARY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN IRAN AND CHINA. EMBOFF REPLIED NEGATIVELY NOTING THIS SEEMED UNLIKELY IN PRESENT STATE OF RELATIONS. GOLOVANOV PRESSED FURTHER AND SUGGESTED IRAN MIGHT WELL TRADE SOME OF ITS ADVANCED U.S. TECHNOLOGY FOR CHINESE HELP IN MAKING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. EMBOFF REJECTED IDEA OF TRADEOFFS, NOTING IRAN'S POSTURE SEEMED FIRM AGAINST ACQUIRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. GOLOVANOV POOED POOED THIS AND SAID WHILE SOVIET UNION EVEN WAS NOT "AFRAID OF IRAN/IF IT HAD 120 ATOMIC BOMBS ", HE THOUGHT THE IRANIANS THEMSELVES MIGHT WANT A BOMB. EMBOFF THOUGHT THIS CONCEPTION WAS FAR-FETCHED AND DISCUSSION PASSED ON TO OTHER SUBJECTS.

2. BIO INFO: GOLOVANOV'S WIFE WAS PRESENT, AN ATTRACTIVE BRUNETTE WHO SPEAKS PASSABLE ENGLISH. THEY HAVE A 12-YEAR-OLD SON NOW STUDYING IN MOSCOW. THE GOLOVANOVS CAME TO IRAN ABOUT A YEAR AND A HALF AGO, AFTER TWO YEARS IN LEBANON AND ONE YEAR IN THE SOVIET UNION. PRIOR TO THAT THEY HAD SPENT FIVE YEARS IN IRAN. GOLOVANOV'S ENGLISH IS FAIR AND HIS FARSI IS EXCELLENT.

SULLIVAN



OPTIONAL FORM 152a(H)
(Formerly FS-413(H)a)
January 1975
Dept. of State





MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Guennadey Kazankin, Russian Embassy, Tehran
John D. Stempel, American Embassy, Tehran

DATE & PLACE: September 11, 1978 - Bridge Hotel Restaurant

SUBJECT : Recent Events in Iran

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, OR, USIS, BIO, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA
INR/OIL/B, AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

azankan had phoned me a week earlier after returning two
eeks early from his vacation in Russia. He had wanted to
et together urgently to "hear your views", but I had put
im off a week.

e began by asking me to brief him on developments since
e had been 'away". I sketched in newspaper style the events
ading up to the change of government and Martial Law. He
essed several times for my views on current conditions
d I replied th t the government seemed to have things
der control with Martial Law. I then dropped a bomb
ell on him by handing him the AP ticker statement
garding President Carter's phone call to the Shah. He
s nonplussed and did not respond with his usual banter
en I asked him when Brezhnev planned to make a similar call.

ll trying to assimilate the implications of the Carter
l, he did say the Soviets viewed the Shah as key and
t the opposition was "not much". In response to my
stion about KGB involvement in recent disturbances, he
ghed this off by saying it was similar to rumors about
involvement in the government. He said "we agree that
Shah is strong especially now that you have shown support
him." (Comment: His inference suggested that the Carter/
phone call was a real surprise to the Soviets and that
had noted our lack of previous formal support.)

nkan was so eager to return to his embassy that we
inated the lunch somewhat early before he had even asked
expected questions on the Middle East summit at Camp
l. He did ask whether I thought Ali Amini would become
Minister and suggested jokingly that the Shah should
Ayatollah Khomeini. I flatly denied that Amini was a
al choice for Court Minister. Upon departing, Kazankin
a point of being irritated that I had been 15 minutes
for our meeting and pressed me several times to agree to
ting within 2-3 weeks. I finally agreed to meet him
October 2, and unless there is some reason not to do
ll postpone that meeting at least 1-2 weeks.

Stempel

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Guennady Kazankan, Soviet Embassy, Tehran
John D. Stempel, American Embassy, Tehran

DATE & PLACE: November 13, 1978, Bridgestreet Restaurant

SUBJECT : Situation in Iran

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, PM, ECON, OR, BIO, NEA/IRN
INR/RNA, INR/OIL/B

Kazankan was more subdued than in previous meetings, probably due to a recent emergence from the hospital with a bout of high blood pressure and heart palpitations. The following points of interest were covered:

Present Situation in Iran: We agreed that the military government appeared to be reestablishing law and order. Kazankan said the Soviet Union hoped conditions in Iran would settle down--natural gas supplies through the pipeline had ceased because of strike action. He then expressed the official Soviet view that the U.S. was not doing enough to help the Shah. I countered by asking him what the Soviets were doing to rein in the Tudeh who had been active in recent disturbances. He said with a straight face that the Embassy policy was to have no official contact with the Tudeh. I repressed a chuckle as he went on to attack CIA Chief Admiral Turner for charging Soviet intervention in Iran. I listened to three minutes of boiler plate and suggested that it was hard not to suspect some Soviet involvement in the wake of what happened in the previous week. We dropped the subject by mutual agreement.

Kazankan probbed U.S. views on what the present situation would do to OPEC oil price decision and I pleaded ignorance in regard to the subject but speculated on a 5-7 percent increase. Kazankan was clearly probbing also for information about the opposition but got no response. When he mentioned Khomeini, however, I noted that the Ayatollah had attacked the Soviet Union, as well as Britain and the U.S. He seemed interested in this and asked if I could supply him with any news reports on Khomeini's activities.

Russian Position in Iran: Kazankan said there had been no incidents against Russians in Iran though several had picked up anti-Shah and anti-foreigner leaflets off the streets. The Russian school remains open though Soviet personnel are





concerned about being seen during strikes. In response to my question, he said there are about 5,000 Soviets in Iran including dependents. He seemed interested in hearing of anti-American incidents but I did not go into specifics merely noting that our people along with others had received the usual round of anti-foreigner circulars.

U.S. Visitors: Near the end of the lunch Kazankan brought out a clipping on the recent visits of Deputy Defense Secretary Duncan and Deputy Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Cooper. He asked about these visits. I replied Duncan's visit had been one where we listened to Iranian plans for future weapons procurement. Obviously eager to get the results, he kept pressing me for what took place. I replied I was not familiar with the details, but I thought some purchases would be deferred. He was beside himself to find out whether AWACS was among them but got no answer. With respect to the Cooper visit, I told him it was merely an opportunity to exchange ideas on global financial problems and that no programs or agreements had come out of it. He expressed scepticism that I was "telling him the truth", and I merely blandly replied, "Guennady would I lie to you?"

As we concluded the lunch and went out to the street, a large tangle of cars approached us, and Kazankan said it was easy for him during the demonstrations, he could just yell the word "Sharavi", the Persian for Russian. I asked him whether he was certain this meant they would kiss him or kick him. He laughed briefly and looked at me as if I knew something he didn't but said nothing.

POL:JDStempel:lab:11-15-78

14 November 1978

SOVIET PRESENCE IN IRAN

1. The total number of slots for official personnel of Soviet Government agencies as established by the Iranian Government is 325. However, it is estimated this limit is exceeded in 1978, as it was in 1977, by at least 25 positions. As this figure does not include dependents, the figure of 350 should be doubled for wives and increased by 100 to account for dependent children, which would then bring the total number to 800. Set forth below by location and agency is the breakdown of the official Soviet presence in Iran.

Tehran:

| | |
|---|---|
| Soviet Embassy | |
| Chancery | 73 |
| Consular Section | 7 |
| Military Attache Office | 8 |
| Office of the Economic Counselor (GKES) | 26 |
| Soviet Commercial Representation | 66 |
| Soviet Hospital | 66 |
| TASS | 2 |
| AEROFLOT | 4 |
| INGOSSTRAKH (Soviet Gov't Insurance Co.) | 5 |
| Russo-Iran Bank | 5 |
| IRSOT (Iran-Soviet Joint Stock Private Forwarding Co.) | ~~10~~ 9 |
| TOTAL IN TEHRAN: | 271 |

Astara:

| | |
|---|---|
| Soviet Commercial Representation | 3 |
| IRSOT | 2 |

Isfahan:

| | |
|---|---|
| Soviet Consulate General | 13 |
| Russo-Iran Bank | 2 |

Rasht:

| | |
|---|---|
| Soviet Consulate General | 10 |





Tabriz:

| | |
|---|---|
| Soviet Commercial Representative | 1 |
| INGOSSTRAKH | 1 |

Mashad:

| | |
|---|---|
| INGOSSTRAKH | 1 |

Bandar-E-Pahlavi:

| | |
|---|---|
| MORFLOT (Merchant Marine Agency) | 3 |
| IRSOT | 7 |
| Soviet Commercial Representation | 2 |

Julfa:

| | |
|---|---|
| IRSOT | 7 |

Nowshahr:

| | |
|---|---|
| IRSOT | 2 |
| TOTAL OUTSIDE TEHRAN: | 54 |
| GRAND TOTAL : | 325 |

2. The Soviet Military Assistance Program in Iran is charged mainly with training Iranians in the use and maintenance of the artillery, transport and engineering equipment supplied by the Soviet Union to the Iranian forces. At present it is estimated there are approximately 120 military specialists under this project assigned to Iran to such areas as the Babak Factory (vehicle maintenance and repair project in the Tehran area), the Isfahan Artillery Center, and the Imperial Iranian Ground Forces Logistics Group. Also under this program is a group of Soviet prefabricated housing specialists located in Tehran, Kermanshah, Ahwaz and Julfa.

3. The Office of the Economic Counselor, which is attached to the Soviet Embassy but, in fact, is subordinate to the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES) in Moscow, is the supervisory office for all Soviet economic and military assistance projects in Iran. Control of all Soviet specialists and projects throughout Iran is exercized through an administrative group in GKES (Tehran) which is staffed by approximately 100 Soviets (including the 26 at

the Embassy). Projects under this office cover a wide range of joint Soviet/Iranian activities in such fields as banking, insurance, steel mills, gas and petroleum, power stations, mining and mineral exploration, coal mines, fisheries, erection of grain elevators and cold storage plants, electrification of railroads, prefabricated housing projects, and vocational training centers. Listed below are the major Soviet projects showing estimated personnel figures and noting any change or expansions since the last report (A-175 November 1977, Appendix A).

Arak Machine Tool Plant: It is now estimated there are 45 Soviet specialists assigned to the plant. Two new plants are being planned, which would increase the number of Soviet specialists required.

Coal Mines: As of December 1975, the number of Soviet personnel working in different mines was 410.

Cold Storage: As of January 1976, there were 76 Soviet specialists assigned to the five known cold storage sites, and no change has been noted.

Fisheries: There are 44 Soviet specialists assigned to the Iran-Soviet Fisheries.

Gas Pipeline and Oil. In December 1975, an agreement on gas was signed by Iran, West Germany, and the Soviet Union. Due to the construction of the pipeline, over 200 Soviet specialists was expected. As of this date it is not known for sure how many Soviet specialists are working on this project, which includes eight gas pipeline stations.

Grain Elevators: Four grain elevators were opened in late 1975 (Niame, Shahgard, Darab and Bardjan), three sites are under construction (Sari, Semnan and Fasa), and three additional sites were selected. The only available figure of Soviet specialists working on this project is 25.

Housing Projects: In September 1976, it was estimated there were 150 Soviet specialists involved in prefab housing factories, the largest being the Aryashahr Prefab Housing Project in Isfahan. Soviet military specialists were also involved in a prefab housing project for the Iranian Armed Forces in Tehran. In late 1976, or early 1977, projects were started in Tabriz and Ahwaz. This would up the figure on Soviet specialists to at least 200.



Mining: A rough estimate of Soviet specialists engaged as advisors and technicians in the mining industry or as mineral surveyors and prospectors would be 180.

Power Stations: In addition to the power plant located at Ahwaz, construction began on the Isfahan Power Station. The latter project is estimated to take six years to complete. The only available figure for Soviets connected with this project remains at 229.

Railroads: A total of approximately 152 Soviet specialists are located in Tabriz and Marand; it is estimated there will eventually be 500 Soviet engineers and technicians assigned to this project.

Steel Mill: The Aryamehr Steel Mill in Isfahan has the largest group of Soviet specialists, which is estimated at 1,586. In early 1978 a preliminary study was made to expand the Steel Mill complex and this would up the figure of Soviet specialists to approximately 1,640.

Vocational Training Centers: There are approximately 70 Soviet specialists assigned to the 16 vocational training schools run jointly by the USSR and the Iranian Ministry of Education.

4. It should be noted that there is constant change in the number of Soviet specialists at any given time in Iran. However, using the above available figures or estimates of Soviet personnel in the various military or economic projects, the total is over 3,500 Soviet specialists. Doubling this figure to provide for wives, plus the official Soviet personnel figure of 800, the total Soviet presence in Iran would be close to 8,000. While this is considered a very conservative estimate, it does show an increase over previous year's estimates.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

# ACTION

ACTION
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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, IR

SUBJECT: BREZHNEV LETTER

FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE WAS PREPARED NOVEMBER 19. IT HAS NOT BEEN USED AT NOON BRIEFINGS. POST MAY USE AS APPROPRIATE.

Q. DOES THE U.S. HAVE A CONTINGENCY PLAN IN CASE THE SHAH'S GOVERNMENT SHOULD FALL?

A. EVERY AMERICAN EMBASSY HAS A CONTINGENCY PLAN TO PROTECT AMERICANS IN THE EVENT OF SERIOUS DISTURBANCES OVERSEAS. SUCH A PLAN EXISTS IN TEHRAN AS IN EVERY OTHER FOREIGN CAPITAL. WE HAVE TAKEN NO STEPS TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN IN IRAN.

Q. BUT DOES THE U.S. HAVE A CONTINGENCY PLAN TO ASSURE THAT THE SHAH REMAINS IN POWER?

A. AS THE PRESIDENT HAS STATED WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANY FOREIGN COUNTRY.

WE NOTE THAT THE SHAH HAS RECENTLY SAID IN A PRESS INTERVIEW THAT HE WOULD NOT WISH FRIENDLY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO INTERVENE ON HIS BEHALF.

Q. WHAT DO WE KNOW OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN IRAN?

A. THE PRESIDENT ADDRESSED THAT QUESTION ON NOVEMBER 13. HE SAID:

"WE DON'T HAVE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS, FOR IN-





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STANCE, ARE TRYING TO DISRUPT THE EXISTING GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE IN IRAN NOR THAT THEY ARE A SOURCE OF VIOLENCE IN IRAN. I THINK THEY RECOGNIZE--THEY HAVE A VERY LONG MUTUAL BORDER WITH IRAN AND A STABLE GOVERNMENT THERE NO MATTER WHO ITS LEADERS MIGHT BE IS VALUABLE TO THEM.

THIS MIGHT CHANGE. IF IT BECOMES OBVIOUS THAT THE SHAH IS VERY VULNERABLE AND THAT OTHER FORCES MIGHT COME INTO POWER, THE SOVIETS MIGHT CHANGE THEIR OBVIOUS POSTURE. BUT THAT IS THE OBSERVATION THAT WE HAVE NOW."

Q. THE STATEMENT DOES NOT MENTION U.S. SUPPORT FOR LIBERALIZATION IN IRAN. INSTEAD IT ENDORSES THE SHAH'S EFFORT TO RESTORE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY. DOES THIS INDICATE A SHIFT IN U.S. POLICY?

A. OUR SUPPORT FOR THE SHAH'S EFFORTS TO LIBERALIZE THE IRANIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM IS WELL KNOWN. THIS POSITION HAS BEEN STATED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS BY THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY VANCE. THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 19 REPRESENTS NO CHANGE IN THE U.S. POSITION.

Q. WAS THE U.S. STATEMENT ON IRAN MADE IN RESPONSE TO THE BREZHNEV STATEMENT?

A. YES.

Q. WAS THE HOTLINE USED OR HAS THE PRESIDENT OTHERWISE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH BREZHNEV ABOUT IRAN?

A. NO COMMENT ON PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

Q. WHY DID BREZHNEV MAKE HIS STATEMENT AT THIS TIME?

A. WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO COMMENT ON SOVIET ACTIONS.

Q. WHAT ACTIONS DOES THE U.S. CONTEMPLATE TO "PRESERVE AND PURSUE" ITS INTERESTS IN IRAN?

A. THE STATEMENT MAKES CLEAR THAT WE CONSIDER IRAN'S DIFFICULTIES STRICTLY AN INTERNAL MATTER.
DIFFICULTIES STRICTLY AN INTERNAL MATTER.

WITHOUT INTERFERING IN ANY WAY IN IRAN'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN AND PROMOTE OUR COOPERATION WITH IRAN ACROSS A BROAD RANGE OF SHARED INTERESTS. THESE INTERESTS TOUCH ON OFFICIAL PROGRAMS OF COOPERATION AS IN POLITICAL AND DEFENSE MATTERS AS WELL AS ON THE LARGE NUMBER OF PROJECTS WHICH PRIVATE AMERICANS ARE

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WORKING ON WITH IRANIANS. CHRISTOPHER
BT
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SECRET EXDIS

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RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 6842
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0005
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 9926
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 3575
RUEHUT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4053
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4084
INFO RUQMFR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 8250
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3425
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 296841/01

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

EXDIS

TAGS: UR, US, IR

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET POSTURE AND INTENTIONS REGARDING SITUATION IN IRAN

REF: TEHRAN 11357

1. FOLLOWING IS INR ANALYSIS OF SOVIET POSTURE AND INTENTIONS REGARDING SITUATION IN IRAN. YOU MAY DRAW ON THIS ANALYSIS, AS APPROPRIATE, IN YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS. IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS, YOU SHOULD ALSO ASK FOR HOST GOVERNMENT'S ASSESSMENT AND VIEWS ON SOVIET MOTIVATIONS AND APPROACH.

2. BEGIN TEXT. INTRODUCTION. BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT ON IRAN ON SUNDAY UNDERSCORES INCREASING SOVIET CONCERN OVER EVENTS IN IRAN AND UNCERTAINTY OVER WHAT MEASURES THE US MAY BE CONTEMPLATING. THE TIMING OF HIS COMMENTS SUGGESTS THEY WERE INTENDED TO OFFSET RECENT WESTERN PRESS-PLAY ON SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN CUBA AND REFLECT SOVIET SENSITIVITY TO ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE USSR IS INVOLVED IN THE PRESENT DISTURBANCES IN IRAN. WE FELL THAT WHILE THE SOVIETS MAY BE TEMPTED TO MEDDLE, THEY REMAIN UNDECIDED AND ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE TEMPORIZING.
3. BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT. WE BELIEVE BREZHNEV'S

SECRET EXDIS

ACTION: POL 2-2
DCM-2
INFO:
AMB
POL
ADM
CRU-DUMMY
2/gth

FILE

I think lots of Sov involvement here need not be dismissed out of hand in our local conversations. It helps the moderate position.

WARNING DOES REFLECT GENUINE SOVIET CONCERN OVER THE PERSISTING UNSTABLE SITUATION ON ITS SOUTHERN FLANK. IT MAY ALSO BE A NOT SO SUBTLE REMINDER TO WASHINGTON THAT THE USSR, LIKE THE US, HAS LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS ON ITS SOUTHERN BORDERS BUT HAS TRADITIONALLY SHOWN CONSIDERABLE RESTRAINT-- UNLIKE THE US IN CUBA--IN CRITICIZING US INVOLVEMENT IN IRAN. HIS STRESS ON THE POINT THAT THE DISTURBANCES IN IRAN WERE AN INTERNAL MATTER AND THAT THE USSR OPPOSES INTERVENTION BY ANY FOREIGN POWER IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY, WAS PROBABLY AN ATTEMPT BY THE SOVIETS TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES PUBLICLY FROM THE SITUATION AND TO UNDERCUT CHARGES OF INVOLVEMENT.

4. SOVIET REACTION TO DISTURBANCES. UNTIL RECENTLY, WE HAVE BEEN STRUCK BY MOSCOW'S RETICENCE REGARDING WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN IRAN. UNTIL LATE OCTOBER, SOVIET MEDIA COVERAGE WAS CONFINED MAINLY TO MILD EXPRESSIONS OF SYMPATHY FOR THE OPPOSITION AND PLIGHT OF THE AVERAGE IRANIAN AND TO DISCUSSIONS OF IRANIAN SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT EXCEPTION WAS THE PRAVDA SEPT. 13 INTERVIEW WITH THE HEAD OF THE TUDEH. YET EVEN

THIS WAS TACKED ON TO THE END OF ANOTHER PIECE AND MERELY BLAMED EVENTS IN IRAN ON SAVAK AND GENERAL DISCONTENT WITH THE SHAH'S POLICIES.

SINCE LATE OCTOBER, SOVIET MEDIA COVERAGE HAS RAISED THE ISSUE OF US SUPPORT FOR THE SHAH AND CRITICIZED THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT. THE COMMENTARY HAS BECOME SHARPER AND MORE CRITICAL. HOWEVER SOVIET MEDIA STILL HAS NOT ATTACKED THE SHAH OR OPENLY EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR HIS OPPONENTS.

THIS RESTRAINT, WE BELIEVE WAS ORIGINALLY DUE TO MOSCOW S BELIEF THAT THE SHAH WOULD SURVIVE, GIVEN THE FRAGMENTED NATURE OF HIS OPPOSITION AND THE MILITARY'S AND US SUPPORT. RECENTLY, THE SOVIETS HARSHER TONE SUGGESTS THEY FEEL THE SHAH'S POSITION HAS BECOME LESS SURE.

5. SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT VOLUMINOUS ALLEGATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SUPPORTING THE [illegible] OUS OR LEFTIST DISSIDENTS. REPORTS OF SOVIET [illegible] OP MOVEMENTS ON THE IRANIAN BORDER AND OF SMUGGLING ARMS INTO IRAN AND UNSUPPORTED





BY OUR EVIDENCE. WE ARE KEEPING A CLOSE WATCH ON THIS.

WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT MOSCOW IS TRYING TO EXACERBATE THE TROUBLES IN IRAN THROUGH THE TUDEH, ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO DO SO IN VIEW OF THE APPARENT ACCEPTANCE OF THE TUDEH AMONG SOME IRAN STUDENTS.

THE TUDEH'S LEADERSHIP CONTINUES TO BE BASED IN EAST GERMANY AND IS PRESUMED TO BE UNDER ALMOST TOTAL SOVIET CONTROL. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION, HOWEVER, ON THE EXTENT OF CONTROL THE EXILED LEADERSHIP HAS OVER ITS MEMBERS STILL IN IRAN BUT BELIEVE IT IS FAR FROM APSOLUTE.
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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3426
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IF MOSCOW HAS DECIDED ON ANY COURSE OF ACTION INVOLVING THE TUDEH, IT MAY HAVE DROPPED ITS PREVIOUS RESTRAINTS ON THE PARTY AND MAY GO SO FAR AS TO ENCOURAGE THE PARTY TO COOPERATE WITH KHOMEINI AND OTHER OPPOSITION LEADERS TO AVOID RAISING THE SPECTRE OF A RED MENACE IN IRAN. MOSCOW MAY HOPE THAT THE TUDEH WILL BECOME AN AVENUE OF INFLUENCE IN THE FUTURE.

6. SOVIET INTENTIONS. IRAN PRESENTS THE USSR WITH A DILEMMA:
A. CONTINUED UNREST OR THE SHAH'S DOWNFALL WOULD CREATE NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE USSR IN THE PERSIAN GULF.
B. BUT THE USSR WOULD NOT WANT INSTABILITY ON ITS BORDERS LEST IT POSSIBLY SPILL OVER INTO SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA, AND SEES LIKELY SUCCESSORS TO THE SHAH--ESPECIALLY A CONSERVATIVE MILITARY OR MUSLIM GOVERNMENT--AS ENDANGERING THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP MOSCOW AND TEHRAN HAVE DEVELOPED OVER THE LAST TEN YEARS, INCLUDING NATURAL GAS IMPORTS FROM IRAN AND OTHER TIES.

ON BALANCE, WE BELIEVE MOSCOW'S PREFERRED OUTCOME WOULD PROBABLY BE A WEAK CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY IN IRAN, AT LEAST FOR THE NEAR TERM. THIS WOULD INSURE SOME STABILITY, YET LIMIT THE SHAH'S MILITARY AMBITIONS





AND -REATE NEW OPENINGS FOR SOVIET INFLUENCE IN IRAN AND THE REGION PERHAPS THROUGH A LEGALIZED TUDEH PARTY.

IN ANY CASE, THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY ON ANTI-US SENTIMENTS OF BOTH THE RIGHT AND LEFT IN IRAN. OTHER THAN THIS, WE EXPECT TO SEE THE

SOVIETS PLAY A GAME OF WAIT AND SEE AND DOUBT THEY PRESENTLY PLAN ANY DIRECT INVOLVEMENT BECAUSE OF THE RISKS AND COSTS INVOLVED. END TEXT. VANCE
BT
#6841

S E C R E T EXDIS

[redacted] ACTIVITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

1. The Soviet Navy's Indian Ocean Squadron typically consists of 18-21 ships, including a submarine, three or four major surface combatants, one amphibious ship, one or two minesweepers, and 8-12 support ships. (Display figure #1: Typical Soviet Combat Presence.)

Most of these ships are detailed from the Soviet Pacific Fleet base at Vladivostok to spend five or six months on duty in the Indian Ocean.

-- In addition, some ships from Soviet western fleets operate for a time with the Squadron as they are transferring to the Pacific Fleet. That was the case with the new V/STOL carrier Minsk which joined the Squadron with three associated ships for several weeks this spring. The Minsk has since completed its voyage to Vladivostok. (S)

2. The Soviet Navy established a continuing presence in the Indian Ocean in 1968. The presence increased gradually until 1972, when it reached an average level of 18-21 ships, a level which has been maintained in normal times since then.

-- Deployments to the region have, however, increased dramatically in connection with special operations. For example, following the Indian-Pakistani war of 1971, the Squadron was involved in mine clearing

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and salvage operations in Chittagong Harbor in Bangladesh. Similarly, the Squadron increased in size during the Middle East war of 1973 and afterwards assisted in clearing Israeli mines from the Suez Canal.

At one point in early 1978, during the period of extensive Soviet military support to Ethiopia in its war with Somalia for control of the Ogaden, the Indian Ocean Squadron reached an all-time high of 31 ships. (S)

3 Because of the Ethiopian-Somali conflict, Soviet naval ships spent 18 percent more days in the Indian Ocean during 1978 than they did in 1977. As indicated on this chart however, (Display figure #2: Indian Ocean Ship-Days) 1974 was the busiest year, due largely to the mine-clearing and salvage operations in Bangladesh and the Suez.

4 As this chart shows (Display figure #3: Soviet Out-of-Area Ship Days), the Soviet Navy spends on the order of 50,000 ship-days a year in waters distant from the USSR. (We count each day that a Soviet naval ship is deployed away from Soviet waters as one ship-day.) Overall, the number of days spent in distant areas during 1978 was slightly higher--about four percent--in 1978 than it was in 1977. (S)

5 You will also note that the Indian Ocean usually ranks third among the regionsof the world to which the Soviets commit naval forces. The largest numbers of ships--about 45 on

any given day--is deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. A number of ships is deployed to North and Central Atlantic waters, followed by the Indian Ocean and then the Pacific. A smaller number is committed to the West African region--some five to seven, currently--although as many as 12 have been present in recent years. And finally, the Soviet Navy deploys a small task force of ships to the Caribbean area about twice a year. (S)

6. The bulk of the Indian Ocean Squadron currently is located in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Some of the ships continue to assist in the delivery of military equipment to Ethiopia but the Squadron spends a substantial portion of its time at anchor. (S)

7. The Soviets have had access to port facilities in a number of countries around the Indian Ocean littoral, the most extensive of which were those developed in Somalia from 1972 to 1977. (Display figure #4: Map of Indian Ocean)

-- Since the expulsion from Somalia, Soviet naval ships have most often used Aden, South Yemen, Ethiopia's Dahlak Island, and an anchorage near the South Yemeni island, Socotra.

-- In addition, these ships make occasional calls to ports such as Umm Qasr, Iraq; Maputo and Nacala, Mozambique; Port Louis, Mauritius; and Victoria, Seychelles.

-- The Soviet Navy relies heavily in the Indian Ocean,



as it does everywhere, on logistic support supplied by naval auxiliaries and naval-associated merchant ships. It is because of this policy that more than half of the Indian Ocean Squadron normally consists of oilers, cargo ships, repair ships and tenders, and other support vessels. (S)

8. Since late 1978, Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft have deployed three times to Aden, South Yemen, from which they have conducted reconnaissance flights over the Indian Ocean. (S)

## Chart 1: Typical Soviet Combatant Presence*




*These are typical rather than average compositions. The numbers vary constantly; the Mediterranean Squadron is generally smaller during the winter than the summer, for example, and the Indian Ocean Squadron includes a cruiser only about six months out of every twelve. During the remainder of the year, there might be two destroyers or frigates of 3,000–10,000 tons in the Indian Ocean.

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## Figure 2 Indian Ocean Ship-Days

Ship-days (thousands)




* 1974 figures ... + 2,727 days devoted to mine-clearing and salvage operations in Bangladesh and the Suez ... appear in the major surface combatant and mine warfare categories.

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Figure 3 Soviet [illegible]t-of-Area Ship-Days

Ship-days (thousa[illegible])




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## SOVIET POSITION IN THE THIRD WORLD

I. The Soviets have suffered setbacks in relations with the US and the PRC and have made little progress in mending rifts inside the Communist alliance and movement, but they have clearly registered gains in the third world, particularly in Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia. Some of these gains have been marginal but--if cleverly exploited--could lead to larger triumphs.

II. The extent of Soviet involvement in Africa has increased significantly in recent years.

A. The number of Soviet advisers--both military and civilian--in 29 African states now totals nearly 8,000. Cubans total almost 50,000.

B. The Soviet Union has signed friendship treaties with Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique--but had one abrogated by Somalia in 1977.

C. The USSR is the principal foreign backer of the Angolan and Ethiopian governments, and is deeply involved with the Rhodesian patriotic front guerrilla movement.

III. Moscow's greatest success ir Africa has, of course, been in Ethiopia.

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A. Mengistu could not have pulled off his military success in the Ogaden and his more limited achievement in Eritrea without Soviet guidance, assistance, and logistic support. The Ogaden campaign in particular was conceived and led by a Soviet general officer--an unprecedented involvement for the Soviets in the third world. And involved 12,400-15,000 Cuban troops, equipped by Soviets.

1. The Soviets have nearly 2,000 military and civilian advisers in Ethiopia and the conclusion of the Soviet-Ethiopian friendship treaty in November indicates that Moscow is digging for the long haul.
2. Possible base rights to replace those lost in Somalia.
   a. Dahlak Island with floating pier and floating barge.

B. But Ethiopia still independent and ethnocentric. Some differences in relations and ultimately Soviets may go out as did in Egypt, etc.





1. Economic agreements suggest Soviets may make a special effort to meet some of Ethiopia's more important needs and thus assure Moscow's long-term presence.

IV. Relations between Moscow and Angola are also good with no indications of serious policy differences.

A. The Soviet-Angolan friendship treaty provided for the strengthening of military cooperation on the "basis of corresponding agreements which are being concluded," an unusual formulation in a Soviet friendship treaty. (1,000 Soviet military advisers, 19-26,000 Cuban military).

1. So far Soviet military assets in Angola include a shore-based communications link between naval headquarters in Moscow and Luanda. The Soviets reportedly run the Luanda naval base where their naval, merchant and fishing ships enter and depart at will. An AMUR-class repair ship has been stationed at the base and has serviced Soviet naval ships, including hull maintenance for the diesel submarine on patrol in the area. Since 1977, Soviet TU-95 long-range aircraft have deployed to Luanda

airfields periodically for reconnaissance operations over the South Atlantic and around the Cape of Good Hope.

2. The aircraft-carrier Minsk recently called in Angola and Mozambique.

B. Military assistance is the foundation of Soviet influence in Angola, but the Soviets have also moved to make their influence felt in key financial and commercial ministries.

C. There have been reports of friction between the Angolans and Soviets and Cubans at the working level, but so far these do not appear to have led to serious differences between the two governments.

The Soviets also want to carve out a larger, more influential role for themselves in Rhodesia, believing that any majority government that achieves power as the result of military struggle will be more dependent on the USSR and less receptive to Western influence.

A. To achieve this objective, the Soviets have:

1. Urged an expansion of military operations by the PF against Rhodesia.





2. Offered to increase deliveries of military equipment to the PF and to increase the number of Soviet and Cuban advisers working in Zambia and Mozambique.

3. Encouraged the major factions of the Patriotic Front to unify their organizations and form a government-in-exile.

4. Have increased military deliveries to Zambia and Mozambique.

B. But, both FLS and PF suspicious of Soviet motives.

C. Military assitance has clearly been the key to Soviet successes in Africa thus far, but poor economic performance could ultimately undermine this success and diminish Soviet prospects in such areas as Nigeria and Guinea where military assistance is accorded a lower priority. Toure has seriously reduced Soviet presence.

1. Nigeria is particularly disenchanted with Soviet economic performance.

VI. President Sadat's willingness to pursue a separate treaty with Israel could provide the Soviets with an opportunity to reverse their recent dismal performance in the Middle East.

A. In recent years, the Soviets have witnessed:

1. The complete deterioration of their relations with Egypt--the former linchpin to the Soviet position in the Arab world.
2. A worsening of relations with Syria because of Syrian intervention in Lebanon against another Soviet client, the PLO. And,
3. Increased Iraqi flexibility which has been marked by economic and military purchases in the West as well as the execution of prominent Iraqi communists.

B. There also are trends in the region that are favorable to the Soviets.

1. The US and West Europe are already faced with higher oil prices, which is in Moscow's interest.
2. Soviet clients in the area--particularly the radical Libyans, the Marxist South Yemenis and the stateless Palestinians--serve as middlemen or at least spokesmen for the USSR.
3. The authority of established governments in the region is becoming more fragile and, as power bases become smaller, the opportunity for Soviet exploitation becomes greater.





4. The demise of CENTO.

C. The Soviets will have to move cautiously to exploit these new opportunities, since key Arab states already are alert to an expansion of Soviet influence in the area. Saudi and Iraqi insecurity, for example, has already been heightened by:

1. The toppling of the nonaligned Afghan government in April 1978 by a Soviet-trained army abetted by a small number of local communists.
2. The assassination of the North Yemeni president by a South Yemeni, and the coup in South Yemen in June 1978 that brought to power a leadership more receptive to the Soviet leadership. And,
3. Soviet logistical support for the South Yemeni's in the recent PDRY attack against North Yemen.

D. The Soviets will also try to exploit Arab resistance to the separate treaty between Egypt and Israel, particularly among the Syrians, the Iraqis, and the Libyans.

1. Even Saudi Arabia has been flirting with the idea of diplomatic contacts with the Soviets because of its recognition of expanded Soviet influence in the region.

VII. Moscow's interest in South Asi is less intense than its interest in the Middle East, but the region is close to the USSR and the Soviets do not want it to be used for actions inimical to the USSR.

A. The Afghan government has always needed Soviet political, military and economic support, but the increasingly close relationship with Moscow threatens Afghan independence and President Taraki s own freedom of action and risks increasing popular discontent. The number of Soviet advisers may have doubled since Taraki's coup--to about 3,500 including 1 200 with the military.

1. Taraki's Soviet-backed regime is already facing serious threats from Moslem insurgencies, which have already forced Moscow to become directly involved in keeping the government afloat.

2. Soviet military advisers have been helping government forces combat the insurgencies in eastern Afghanistan, where Soviet pilots reportedly have flown MI-24 helicopter gunship operations along the Afghan border with Pakistan.





3. Soviet advisers may have also taken part in bombing rebel-held positions in Herat recently, and Soviet military and civilian advisers have been killed by various anti-government forces.

4. Soviet efforts to protect their equity in Afghanistan could complicate Soviet relations with both India and Pakistan and could even jeopardize chances for Senate ratification of the SALT II treaty.

III. The Soviets are also acting to bolster their strategic position in Asia in the wake of the Sino-Japanese rapprochement, the normalization of Sino-American relations, and Beijing's abrogation of the Sino-Soviet f: ndship treaty. The Soviets appear to believe that a stronger military position in the area will in the long term compel the North Asian nations to take Soviet interests into account.

A. The most dramatic Soviet moves have been in the Pacific.

1. The Soviets now have the aircraft carrier Minsk under the Pacific command.

2. Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border are being upgraded and, earlier this year,

the Soviets held the most extensive military exercise ever staged along the border.

3. General Petrov reportedly has become the commander-in-chief of a newly formed Far East command and also participated in the exercise.

B. The continuous enhancement of Soviet forces in Asia will not contribute to the success of Moscow's intensified diplomatic activity in the area.

1. The Soviet presence in Vietnam will irritate other Southeast Asia countries and complicate Soviet bilaterals with them.

2. Soviet activity in the Northern Territories will not go down well with the Japanese, who have used it to justify higher military budgets and closer defense cooperation with the US.

3. An antagonistic Soviet posture on the border with China certainly does not augur well for talks that are tentatively slated to begin in Moscow in mid-September.

a. It is possible for example in view of China's previous precondition for Soviet withdrawal from Mongolia, that Soviet





deployments along the Sino-Soviet-Monyolia border will become an intractable problem in the early stages of negotiations.

b. The recent border incident along the Sino-Soviet border could also delay the talks.

C. Soviet activity could, therefore, accelerate trends toward greater Sino-US-Japanese cooperation that Moscow would like to forestall.

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2. (U) REPORT NO: 1 669 0078 79

3. (U) TITLE: SIS UPDATE

4. NA

5. (U) DATE OF INFO: 7901XX-7902XX

6. (U) DATE OF REPORT: 790205

7. (U) DATE & PLACE OF ACQ: 790125-790204, TEHRAN, IRAN

8. (U) REF: HQ CR 42

9. (U) ASSESS: SOURCE: A; INFO: 2

10. (U) ORIGINATOR: AFOSI DIST 72, TEHRAN, IRAN, 7972D356-608/05-436

11. NA

12. (U) PREPARING OFFICER: SA TOBY L. SULLIVAN/TLS, AFOSI DIST 72, TEHRAN, IRAN

13. (U) APPROVING AUTHORITY: FRANK M. HUEY, LT COL, ~~USAF~~,

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TO:

(3) (S-NOFORN-WNINTEL) PREVIOUSLY LISTED AS BEING IN IRAN BUT SINCE DEPARTED:

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PATUSHKOV, V.B., CHANCERY (DOD: NOV 77)

(4) (S-NOFORN-WNINTEL) DEPARTED IRAN BUT STILL CARRIED IN LIST:

RAMKOV, A.M., HOSPITAL. (SA SULLIVAN)

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IO'S:

FADIYEV, I.A., CHANCERY (RESIDENT KGB)

OSTROVENKO, Y.D., CHANCERY (PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT TO BE RESIDENT KGB, NOW THOUGHT TO BE DEPUTY)

SELIVANOV, Y.T., CHANCERY (PASS DEPUTY RESIDENT KGB)

(DOI: 7901XX; DPOA: 790204, TEHRAN; EVAL: A-2; SOURCE: 7200 CA( 1E(1); SA TERRENCE J. OLISS, DIST 72)

ORIGIANTOR'S COMMENTS: (U) THIS REPORT IS PROVIDED TO UPDATE INFORMATION ON THE 436 PRESENCE IN IRAN.

DOWNGRADING AND DECLASS DATA: CLASSIFIED BY AFOSI/CC IAW AFOSIR 205-3 DTD 19 APR 77, XGDS-TWO, REVIEW FOR DECLASS 4 FEB 1999.

ATTACHMENT: PERSONNEL LISTING (S-NOFORN-WNINTEL)

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

RELEASER: TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE

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DATE TIME GROUP

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REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 JUL 65, WHICH WILL BE USED.



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RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0427
RUMJHT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0190
RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 4633
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9935
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1310
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 7024
RUQMJR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0965
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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 01/12/99 (GARRISON, MARK) OR-M
TAGS: IR, UR, US, PEPR

SUBJECT: SOVIET ACADEMIC DISCUSSES IRAN

1.(C-ENTIRE TEXT) EMBOFF CALLED ON CHIEF OF THE ORIENTAL INSTITUTE'S MIDDLE ASIA SECTION (AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, IRAN, TURKEY), YURIY GANKOVSKIY, ON JANUARY 10 TO DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN. GANKOVSKIY, WHO USUALLY MEETS WITH EMBOFF ALONE, WAS JOINED BY A SOVIET "RESEARCHER" IN THE INSTITUTE WHO TOOK NOTES.

2. GANKOVSKIY WAS OBVIOUSLY UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO ELICIT U.S. VIEWS ON IRAN. HE QUICKLY DIRECTED THE CONVERSATION AWAY FROM AFGHANISTAN, ASKING FOR THE U.S. ASSESSMENT ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A MILITARY COUP IN IRAN AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THE BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT TO SURVIVE. EMBOFF ANSWERED THAT THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT ONLY THE IRANIANS CAN SOLVE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS, AND THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WISHES SUCCESS FOR THE BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT WHICH IS BEING ESTABLISHED ON THE BASIS OF IRAN'S CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES.

3. EMBOFF FOLLOWED THIS ANSWER BY CRITICIZING THE CONTINUING INCREASE IN SOVIET MEDIA CHARGES OF U.S. INTERFERENCE IN IRAN. ASKED FOR AN EXPLANATION FOR THIS TREND, GANKOVSKIY CITED SIMILAR CHARGES IN THE

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U.S. PRESS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION, THE "VISIT OF A U.S. GENERAL" TO IRAN, AND THE DISPATCH OF U.S. NAVAL VESSELS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN.

4. GANKOVSKIY STATED THAT, WHILE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR THE BAKHTIAR EFFORT, THE SURVIVABILITY OF HIS GOVERNMENT IS NOT ASSURED AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A MILITARY COUP SHOULD NOT BE RULED OUT. HE NOTED THAT BAKHTIAR HIMSELF HAD BEEN JAILED BY THE SHAH SEVEN TIMES AND, ALONG WITH OTHER "LIBERAL" NATIONAL FRONT LEADERS LIKE SANJABI, HAS BEEN BEHIND THE WORK STOPPAGES IN IRAN. THE TACTICS USED TO CREATE WORK STOPPAGES HAVE BEEN COERCIVE; WORKERS ARE THREATENED WITH BODILY HARM OR THE BURNING OF THEIR HOMES IF THEY DO NOT COOPERATE WITH THE STRIKERS.

5. GANKOVSKIY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE TUDEH IS PARTICIPATING IN THE AGITATIONS. HE REMARKED THAT THE TUDEH CAN, OF COURSE, ONLY BE HAPPY AT THE SHAH'S PLIGHT. LIKE OTHER SOVIETS HERE, HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THE TUDEH IS "VERY WEAK" AND IS NOT A SERIOUS CONTENDER FOR POWER IN IRAN. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)
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E.O. 12065: XDS [illegible] 3/09 (GARRISON, MARK) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, [illegible], US, ENRG

SUBJECT: SOVIET MFA IRANIAN DESK OFFICER DISCUSSES IRAN

1. IN SUMMARY (C): DURING EMBOFF CALL ON MFA IRANIAN DESK OFFICER FOLLOWING SUBJECTS WERE DISCUSSED:

A. SOVIET MEDIA TREATMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN. RESPONDING TO EMBOFF'S CHARGE THAT SUCH ARTICLES WERE "MOST UNHELPFUL" IN PRESENT DELICATE SITUATION, SOVIET AGREED THAT ARTICLES WERE RATHER TOUGH ON U.S., BUT ARGUED THAT THEY REFLECTED SOVIET CONCERN OVER WASHINGTON ACTIONS AND WASHINGTON-BASED REPORTS OF VARIOUS U.S. CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR IRAN.
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B. SOVIET-IRANIAN TREATY OF 1921. SOVIET DEFENDED

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CONTINUED VIABILITY OF TREATY SAYING THAT IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAD NEVER ABROGATED IT. HE DENIED THATRECENT SOVIET MEDIA REFERENCES TO TREATY REPRESENTED A WARNING OF POSSIBLE SOVIET INTERVENTION.

-- SHAH. SPEAKING "BETWEEN OURSELVES," SOVIET ASKED EMBOFF TO AGREE THAT ROLE OF SHAH WAS OVER OR, AT LEAST, SO LIMITED AS TO BE ONLY NEGLIGIBLE FACTOR ON FUTURE IRANIAN SCENE.

-- BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT. SOVIET NOTED THAT SOVIET CRITICISM OF BAKHTIAR AND HIS EFFORT TO FORM NEW GOVERNMENT HAD SO FAR BEEN "INDIRECT", BUT HE ADMITTED THAT CRITICISM WAS STRONG AND STEADY. BAKHTIAR HAS LITTLE CHANCE FOR SURVIVAL, HE CONCLUDED.

-- CESSATION OF GAS DELIVERIES TO SOVIET UNION. SOVIET ADMITTED THAT CUTOFF OF IRANIAN GAS FLOW TO SOVIET UNION HAD CAUSED "CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES" IN THOSE PORTIONS OF THE SOVIET SOUTHERN REPUBLICS WHICH USED THE GAS.

-- RUMORS OF SOVIET TROOP DEPLOYMENT TO SOUTHERN BORDER REGION. ASKED ABOUT PREVALENT RUMORS OF SOVIET TROOP MOVEMENTS IN REGION ADJACENT TO IRANIAN BORDER, SOVIET DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF ANYTHING "UNUSUAL." END SUMMARY.

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT) ON JANUARY 12 EMBOFF PAID ROUTINE CALL ON MFA IRANIAN DESK OFFICER, COUNSELOR N.I. KOZYREV. NO NOTE TAKERS WERE PRESENT AND BOTH EMBOFF AND KOZYREV ASSURED EACH OTHER THAT THEY WERE SPEAKING "INFORMALLY" AND NOT UNDER INSTRUCTIONS. PRIOR TO THE DISCUSSION ITSELF, EMBOFF GAVE KOZYREV COPY OF DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S JANUARY 10 ANNOUNCEMENT AND COMMENTS ON F-15 DEPLOYMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND TRANSCRIPT OF SECRETARY'S JANUARY 11 PRESS CONFERENCE REMARKS. WITH REGARD TO LATTER, EMBOFF WENT OVER IRAN PORTIONS WORD-BY-WORD TO BE SURE KOZYREV UNDERSTOOD THEM IN BOTH ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN. DURING DISCUSSION, FOLLOWING TOPICS WERE TOUCHED UPON:
SOVIET MEDIA TREATMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN.

2. EMBOFF SAID THAT [redacted] WAS APALLED AT HYSTERICAL TONE OF RECENT SOVIET [redacted] RTICLES ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN, PARTICULARLY [redacted] ARTICLES AS PIECE BY AUTHORITATIVE COLUMNIST VITALIY KOBYSH IN JANUARY 10 LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, ARTICLE BY PERHAPS PSEUDONONYOUS A. PETROV IN JANUARY 11 PRAVDA, AND HATCHET JOB BY V. VINOGRADOV IN JANUARY 11 KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. SUCH ARTICLES WERE

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RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0867
RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 0300
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 7323
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0893
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RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9943
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 7030
RUMJPG/USLO PEKING [redacted]
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"MOST UNHELPFUL" IN PRESENT DELICATE SITUATION, AND CERTAINLY DID NOT HELP IN THE TASK OF EASING U.S.-SOVIET TENSIONS OVER THIS SITUATION.

3. KOZYREV RESPONDED THAT SOVIET PRESS, WHILE REFLECTING SOVIET POLICY, WAS NOT NECESSARILY IDENTICAL WITH IT. "SPEAKING PERSONALLY," HE SAID, RECENT ARTICLES WERE "RATHER TOUGH" ON U.S. AND WERE PERHAPS A BIT EXAGGERATED. SOVIET MEDIA WERE TRYING TO EDUCATE SOVIET PUBLIC TO DANGERS OF PRESENT IRANIAN SITUATION AND WERE TRYING TO REFLECT "FLOOD" OF ARTICLES FROM U.S. AND WESTERN PAPERS. THOSE ARTICLES WERE FULL OF REPORTS - SOME SEEMINGLY AUTHORITATIVE - ON VARIOUS U.S. CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR IRAN. IN THIS REGARD, U.S. MEDIA - AND OFFICIAL - COMMENTS ON ALLEGED SOVIET PLANS WERE ALSO UNHELPFUL AND HAD TO BE ANSWERED IN SOVIET PRESS.

4. EMBOFF NOTED EMPHASIS IN CURRENT SOVIET PRESS CAMPAIGN ON ALLEGED U.S. "INTERFERENCE" IN IRAN. SOME OBSERVERS IN MOSCOW, HE SAID, WONDERED IF THIS EMPHASIS MIGHT NOT REPRESENT A FORM OF ADVANCE JUSTIFICATION FOR FUTURE SOVIET "INTERFERENCE" OF SOME UNSPECIFIED SORT. KOZYREV SAID HE HAD FEELING THAT EXACT OPPOSITE WAS

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TRUE; THAT U.S. WAS CREATING SPECTRE OF "SOVIET THREAT" TO JUSTIFY ITS OWN ACTIONS. HE ADDED THAT WHEREAS U.S. ADMITTED IT HAD NO EVIDENCE OF SOVIET INTERFERENCE, SOVIETS HAD WITNESSED ASSIGNMENT OF ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL TO U.S. EMBASSY IN TEHRAN, MOVEMENT OF U.S. SHIPS IN REGION, VISIT OF GENERAL HUYSER TO IRAN, DEPLOYMENT OF F-15'S TO SAUDIA ARABIA, AND OTHER EXAMPLES OF U.S. PREOCCUPATION WITH IRAN SUCH AS RECENTLY REPORTED MEETING ON IRAN ATTENDED BY THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY, SECDEF BROWN, AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER BREZEZINSKI. SOVIET POSITION WAS CRYSTAL CLEAR, HE EMPHASIZED. AS BREZHNEV SAID IN HIS NOVEMBER 19 "ANSWER" TO TASS CORRESPONDENT, SOVIET UNION WANTED NO OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IN IRAN FROM ANY SOURCE.

SOVIET-IRANIAN TREATY OF 1921

5. EMBOFF ASKED ABOUT SIGNIFICANCE OF RECENT SOVIET MEDIA REFERENCE TO CONTINUED VIABILITY OF SOVIET-IRANIAN TREATY OF 1921. KOZYREV DENIED THAT THESE REFERENCES SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS A WARNING OF POSSIBLE FUTURE SOVIET INTERVENTION JUSTIFIED BY ARTICLES 5 AND 6 OF THE TREATY. HE EXPLAINED THAT MEDIA REFERENCE WAS NOT INTENDED AS A WARNING BUT AS A REMINDER TO THE IRANIANS AND TO THE U.S. THAT JUST AS THE U.S. HAD MILITARY AND OTHER AGREEMENTS WITH IRAN, SO DID THE SOVIET UNION HAVE AGREEMENTS AND THEREFORE INTERESTS WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

6. EMBOFF NOTED THAT THERE WAS FEELING IN IRAN THAT 1921 TREATY HAD BEEN SUPERCEDED BY TIME AND BY OTHER AGREEMENTS. KOZYREV ADMITTED THAT IRANIAN PRESS AND EVEN IRANIAN FOREIGN OFFICE HAD FROM TIME TO TIME QUESTIONED THE CONTINUED VIABILITY OF THE TREATY, BUT, HE WENT ON, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAD NEVER ABROGATED THE TREATY AND, THEREFORE, LIKE ALL SUCH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, IT REMAINED IN FORCE. HE ALSO NOTED FEBRUARY 26, 1971 EXCHANGE OF TELEGRAMS BETWEEN SHAH AND TEEN CHAIRMAN OF PRESIDIUM OF SUPREME SOVIET PODGORNY ON 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF TREATY.

ROLE OF SHAH

7. EMPHASIZING THAT CONVERSATION WAS "BETWEEN OURSELVES," KOZYREV ASKED IF EMBOFF DID NOT AGREE THAT ROLE OF SHAH HAD ENDED, THAT SHAH WOULD EITHER LEAVE IRAN OR WOULD, IN FUTURE, BE ALLOWED SUCH A LIMITED POLITICAL ROLE AS TO BE A MERE FIGUREHEAD. EMBOFF SAID ONLY THAT WHILE IT WAS CLEAR THAT SHAH'S ROLE

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WOULD NEVER BE SAME AS IT WAS, EMBOFF DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT KNOWLEDGE TO COMMENT FURTHER.

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BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT.

8- EMBOFF EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT VEHEMENCE OF SOVIET MEDIA CRITICISM OF BAKHTIAR AND HIS EFFORT TO FORM NEW GOVERNMENT. KOZYREV NOTED THAT CRITICISM HAD SO FAR BEEN INDIRECT, BUT HE FREELY ADMITTED THAT MOSCOW WAS CRITICAL OF BAKHTIAR AND FELT THAT HE DID NOT HAVE

THE SUPPORT OF THE MASSES IN IRAN. WHAT BAKHTIAR WAS TRYING TO DO, HE EXPLAINED, WAS TO ATTRACT THE NATIONAL/ BOURGEOISIE AND THE RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS WHILE ISOLATING THE RADICAL WORKERS AND THE LEFT. HOW COULD MOSCOW SUPPORT SUCH A POLICY, HE ASKED RHETORICALLY. IN ANY CASE, HE WENT ON, BAKHTIAR IS FATALLY TAINTED BY THE



SHAH; HE IS OPPOSED BY THE NATIONAL FRONT (ALSO A NATIONAL/BOURGEOIS GROUP); AND, PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, HE IS OPPOSED BY KHOMEINI.
CESSATION OF GAS DELIVERIES TO THE SOVIET UNION.
9. IN RESPONSE TO EMBOFF'S QUESTION, KOZYREV ADMITTED THAT STOPPAGE OF IRANIAN GAS FLOW TO SOVIET UNION IS CAUSING "CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES" IN THOSE SOVIET SOUTHERN REPUBLICS WHICH USE THIS GAS. KOZYREV'S ONLY RESPONSE WHEN EMBOFF ASKED IF THIS PROBLEM WAS OF SPECIAL CONCERN TO SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS TO ASK, "WHAT CAN WE DO?"
RUMORS OF SOVIET TROOP DEPLOYMENT

1Ø, EMBOFF ASKED WHAT KOZYREV COULD SAY ABOUT RUMORS PREVALENT IN MOSCOW AND ELSEWHERE THAT SOVIETS WERE TAKING VARIOUS MILITARY STEPS IN SOVIET REGION CLOSE TO IRANIAN BORDER INCLUDING MOVEMENT OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS INTO AREA. KOZYREV SAID THAT "SPEAKING FRANKLY" HE KNEW OF NOTHING "UNUSUAL" IN THAT REGARD. HE SAID THAT A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF MILITARY ACTIVITIY WAS NATURAL ALONG A BORDER OF OVER 12ØØ KM, AND HE CONCLUDED THAT HE FELT THESE RUMORS WERE BEING STIRRED UP BY THOSE SEEKING A PRETEXT FOR MILITARY MOVES OF THEIR OWN. EMBOFF RESPONDED THAT IF KOZYREV HAD U.S. IN MIND, HE WAS WRONG ON BOTH COUNTS.TOON
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